36 95. Moreover, once detained she was under the control of repressive official bodies, State officials, or individuals whom act with the acquiescence or tolerance of the State, whom carry out acts of torture and murder with impunity, which represent, in and of themselves, a breach to the right to prevent violations of personal integrity and life, established in Articles 5 and 4 of the American Convention, even assuming that the facts of torture or deprivation of life of the persons in the specific case cannot be proven. 109 96. Even though there is no categorical information about what happened to María Claudia after the abduction of her daughter, the practice of enforced disappearances have often entailed, on the one hand, the execution of those detained, in secrecy and without trial, followed by the concealment of the bodily remains in order to erase all material evidence of the crime and to allow for the impunity of those responsible, that which is a brutal violation of the right to life, recognized in Article 4 of the Convention. 97. The state of pregnancy in which she was in when detained constituted a condition of particular vulnerability, reason for which—in her case—there was differential treatment. In turn, in Argentina she had been separated from her husband and later transported to Uruguay without knowing his fate, which in itself represented a cruel and inhumane act. Subsequently, she was retained in a clandestine center of detention and torture, SID, where her given differential treatment in regard to other detainees, seeing as she was separated from these, was not carried out in order to comply with the special obligation to protect her, but rather in what regards her unlawful detention, her transfer to Uruguay, and her possible enforced disappearance, which was, the use of her body in order to give birth, and for her daughter to be breastfeed, who was given to another family after being abducted and her identity substituted for another.(infra paras. 106 to 116). The facts of the case reveal a particular conception of women that threatens freedoms entailed in maternity, that which forms an essential part of the free development of the female personhood. The foregoing is even more serious if one considers, as indicated, that her case took place in a context of disappearances of pregnant women and illegal abductions of children in the framework of Operation Condor. 98. The mentioned acts committed against Maria Claudia García can be classified as one of the most serious and reprehensible forms of violence against women,110 perpetrated against her by State officials from Argentina and Uruguay, which severely affected her personal integrity, were clearly based on her gender, and                                                          109 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez, supra note 20, para. 175; Case of Ticona Estrada et al. V. Bolivia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2008. Series C No. 191, para. 59, and Case of Anzualdo Castro, supra note 75, para. 85. 110 Cf., In this sense, Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention of Belem do Para. As has been noted previously by this tribunal, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination of all forms of Violence against Women has maintained the definition of discrimination against women to “include violence based on sex, that is, violence directed at a women [i] because hse is a women or[ii] because it affects her in a disporportionate form.” Moreover, it has also noted that “[t]he violence against women is a form of discrimination that severly impedes the enjoyment of rights and freedoms as to those of man.” Cf., In this regard, Case of González et al.s (“Campo Algodonero”), supra note 79, para. 395; Case of Fernández Ortega et al.. V. México. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 30, 2010 Series C No. 215, para. 129, and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. supra note 9, para. 120.