78 [T]he issuance of amnesty laws is of the judicial-constitutional competence of the Congress of the Republic, in such a way that the judicial rulings which are issued pursuant to constitutionally legitimate amnesty laws lead to the configuration of the constitutional res judicata. The control of the amnesty laws, however, part of the presumption that the criminal legislature intended to carry out within the scope of the Constitution and respect 275 for fundamental rights. [Said assumption] does not operate when it is proven that during the exercise of the competence to enact amnesty laws, the criminal legislator intended to also encompass the commission of crimes against humanity. Nor when the exercise of said competence was 276 used to “guarantee” impunity for serious violations of human rights. On the merits[,] the Tribunal considers that amnesty laws [in question] are null and void and lack, ab initio, legal effect. Therefore, the orders enacted so as to guarantee impunity 277 of the violation of human rights by [state agents] are also null and void. 219. In the same sense, the Supreme Court of Uruguay ruled in regard to the Expiry Law, considering that: [no one] denies that a law enacted by a special majority and in extraordinary cases, the State may decide to waive punishment for criminal facts. [However, the law is 278 unconstitutional because, in the case, the Legislative Power exceeded the constitutional scope for awarding amnesties [because] to declare the expiration of criminal prosecutions, in any case, exceeds the powers of the legislators and invades the forum of a function constitutionally assigned to judges, so that, for whatever reason, the legislature could not be attributed with the power of deciding that the period had expired regarding prosecution for certain crimes. 279  [...] no political agreement or its logical corollary can reverse the original or delegated representation of sovereignty and, therefore, is absolutely unacceptable to issue a valid legal, effective or acceptable norm. [...] Thus, when art. 1 of Law No. 15.848 recognizes another source of normative law, it departs significantly from [its] constitutional makeup. [...] [Article 3 of Law No. 15.848] conditions the jurisdictional activity to a decision of the Executive Branch, with absolute efficiency, which collides ostensibly with the powers of the Judge to establish responsibility for the commission of crimes [...] [C]urrent regulation of human rights is not based on the position of sovereign States, but in the person as holder, given his or her status as such, of essential rights that can not be ignored based on the exercise of the constituent power, neither original nor derivative. 280 In this framework, [the amnesty law] under consideration affected the rights of many people (notably, the victims, the next of kin, or those harmed by the human rights violations mentioned above), their right to a remedy, an impartial and exhaustive investigation to ascertain the facts, to identify those responsible and to impose the                                                          275 Constitutional Tribunal of Peru, Case of Santiago Martín Rivas, Constitutional tort remedy, supra note 274, para. 52. 276 Constitutional Tribunal of Peru, Case of Santiago Martín Rivas, Constitutional tort remedy, supra note 274, para. 53. 277 Constitutional Tribunal of Peru, Case of Santiago Martín Rivas, Constitutional tort remedy, supra note 274, para. 60. 278 Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay, Case of Nibia Sabalsagaray Curutchet, Judgment No. 365 supra note 163, paras. 8 and 9. 279 Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay, Case of Nibia Sabalsagaray Curutchet, supra note 163, Considering clause III.2, para. 13. 280 Supreme Court of Justice of Uruguay, Case of Nibia Sabalsagaray Curutchet, supra note 163, Considering clause III.8, para. 6.