necessary to examine the suitability of this restriction in relation to each of these objectives. 55. First, despite the State’s arguments, there continues to be a high degree of uncertainty as regards the possible causal relationship between the said measure and the protection of State sovereignty. In addition to the fact that “sovereignty” is distinguished by its capacity to convey competing claims87 – and its composition is clearly paradoxical88 – the way in which the State cited this concept was even more imprecise. The arguments made in the answering brief fluctuate between two different arguments. The first appears to suggest that notarial acts, as such, protect the State’s sovereignty – by means of the attestation authority; therefore, the protection of sovereignty would be reinforced by the exclusive practice of such acts by the country’s nationals.89 However, the causal relationship is unclear because, in Guatemala, the notary’s function is, above all, dedicated to attributing certainty and truth to the intentions expressed by private individuals,90 an activity that, if it is exercised exclusively by the country’s nationals, does not appear to increase the protection of the State’s supreme authority in its territory perceptibly, or to reinforce its independence in relation to other States – the domain in which the concept of “sovereignty” usually operates,91 since the Peace of Westphalia.92 56. The second argument, which is more indirect, indicates that the possible admission of non-nationals into the body of notaries would impair the sovereignty of Guatemala because it is the State that, in exercise of its sovereignty, vests attestation authority in the notary by law, and that the State is the ultimate authority to establish the criteria for the exercise of the notarial function.93 However, invoking sovereignty in this way would be trying to evade the impact of international law, because what is being examined in this case is precisely the proportionality of the restrictive criteria chosen by the State in relation to the human rights established in the Convention.94 This appeal to sovereignty is in total contradiction to the idea that this attribute is conditioned by international law,95 either in the domain of the law of treaties,96 or in that of the protection of human rights.97 In both 87 Cf. GRIMM, Dieter. Sovereignty: the origin and future of a political and legal concept. Trad. Belinda Cooper. New York: Columbia University Press, 2015, pp. 92 and ff.., which rightly indicates that the advent of a multilevel system in the European context has reactivated “sovereignty” by giving voice to positions concerning a political order that is referred to as a post-sovereign era. 88 This is because “sovereignty” functions as an external reference for two social system that, since they are self-founded, lack external references, as indicated by NEUENSCHWANDER MAGALHÃES, Juliana. Formação do conceito de soberania: história de um paradoxo. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2016, p. 238. 89 Cf. Answering brief of June 14, 2021, para. 180(f): “Sovereignty is protected by this means (the attestation authority/fe pública) […].” 90 Cf. Answering brief of June 14, 2021, para. 225. Cf. BESSON, Samantha. Sovereignty. In: Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. Available at: https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law9780199231690-e1472. Accessed on March 14, 2023. 91 92 Cf. DIHN, Nguyen Quoc. DAILLER, Patrick. PELLET, Alain. Direito Internacional Público. 2ª ed. Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2003, p. 53. 93 Cf. Answering brief of June 14, 2021, para. 82. Cf. CANÇADO TRINDADE, Antônio Augusto. Tratado de direito internacional de direitos humanos. 2. ed. Porto Alegre: Sergio Antonio Fabris, 2003. v. 2, p. 29: “Once assumed [treaty-based human rights obligations], States may no longer invoke sovereignty – in any case inadequate, in its absolute sense, at the level of international relations – as an element for interpreting treaties to which they are parties.” 94 95 Article 14, Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States ([1949] I.L.C. Yearbook 286): “Every State has the duty to conduct its relations with other States in accordance with international law and with the principle that the sovereignty of each State is subject to the supremacy of international law.” In this regard, Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.” 96 97 Cf. JACKSON, Robert. Sovereignty: Evolution of an idea. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007, p. 124: “International human rights law is a law of sovereign states that is fundamentally concerned with the safety, freedom, and dignity of individual human beings and with the obligations of states in that regard.” 15