212. The Court has determined that the personal integrity of Mr. Movilla’s relatives has been violated (supra para. 188). Therefore, as it has done in other cases,230 it deems it necessary to order a measure of reparation that provides appropriate attention to the psychological and/or psychiatric suffering of the victims. 213. With regard to the PAPSIVI, which the State has identified as the “most appropriate mechanism” for providing care to the victims, expert Torres Bocachica pointed out that the victims in this case have been “referred to the PAPSIVI,” but have not received treatment. She also said it was important to ascertain whether the Program really has coverage in rural areas, and whether the care is actually provided by Health Promoting Entities (EPS), since many do not have experience in treating victims. In her oral testimony, Candelaria Vergara insisted that she was not prepared to receive treatment from the PAPSIVI, even if she were registered with them. She added that she does not trust that entity, “because it’s part of the State, they are the representatives of those who harmed [her]” and disappeared her husband. 214. Expert Cepeda Pérez explained how the PAPSIVI functions, pointing out that it was designed specifically to treat victims. He said the Program had two components, one for comprehensive health care and another for psychosocial care, and that the former offers services nationwide, while the latter does not. He commented that, on average (based on data collected between 2017 and 2019), the first six sessions were used to help the beneficiaries “get on board with the process.” Financial resources were not the main consideration, but treatment was not necessarily provided completely free of charge in every case. Decisions were taken based on the principles of equity, solidarity and sustainability, and the patient’s “SISBÉN score” (score calculated by the System for the Identification of Potential Social Program Beneficiaries). 215. The Court appreciates the efforts of State agencies to provide treatment to a large number of victims. While accepting the observations of expert Cepeda, the Court is bound to point out that its remit is not to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the Program, but rather to gauge how appropriate it would be for it to serve as a measure of reparation for the victims in this case. In fact, the Court does not believe it would be an appropriate way of implementing the measure of rehabilitation, because it would be directly contrary to the victims’ wishes. Moreover, it notes that some aspects of the Program, such as the fact that the beneficiaries might be charged for the services provided, may not be consistent with the reparation to which they are entitled. Leaving aside the question of whether such services should be provided free of charge as part of a general public policy, in this judgment the Court has ruled that specific harm has been done to specific victims. It is not consistent with a decision of this kind that the victims should have to pay the party responsible for the harm done to them for a service that is part of the reparation that the latter party has been ordered to provide. 216. Therefore, this Court finds it appropriate, in this case, to allocate a sum of money so the victims can obtain the treatment they need. This Court orders the State, within six months of the notification of this judgment, to pay each of the victims in need of treatment the sum of six thousand United States dollars (USD 6,000.00). Payment of this sum shall not be made dependent on the victims effectively demonstrating, before or after they receive treatment, the medical and/or psychological expenses they have incurred or will incur. Furthermore, the State shall follow the guidelines set out below regarding the payment of sums of money (infra paras. 254 to 259). Once the State has paid all the sums of money ordered, it shall inform the Court immediately. The one-year deadline for the State to submit its first report established in operative paragraph 14 of this judgment does not apply to this measure of reparation. Cf. Case of Barrios Altos v. Peru. Reparations and costs. Judgment of November 30, 2001. Series C No. 87, paras. 42 and 45, and Case of Maidanik et al. v. Uruguay, supra, para. 225. 230 56