15 be interpreted (supra pars. 16 and 17) in view of the pro persona principle, that is to say, they should be interpreted in favor of the individual46 as “imposing restrictions designed to delimit strictly its application and scope, in order to reduce the application of the death penalty to bring about its gradual disappearance”.47 A.1) The limitation of the application of the death penalty to the “most serious crimes” 53. The Court has previously held that the intentional and illicit deprivation of another’s life (intentional or premeditated murder, in the broad sense) can and must be recognized and addressed in criminal law under various categories (criminal classes) that correspond with the wide range of seriousness of the surrounding facts, taking into account the different facets that can come into play: a special relationship between the offender and the victim [e.g. infanticide], motives for the behavior [e.g. for reward or remunerative promise], the circumstances under which the crime is committed [e.g. brutality], the means employed by the offender [e.g. poison], etc. This approach allows for a graduated assessment of the seriousness of the offence, so that it will bear an appropriate relation to the graduated levels of gravity of the applicable punishment.48 54. Thus, the Convention reserves the most severe form of punishment for the most severe illicit acts. Nevertheless, as stated previously, Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act simply states that where a person is found guilty of murder, that person shall be sentenced to death. Regardless of the manner in which the murder is committed or the means employed, the penalty is the same for all murders in Barbados. That is, the Offences Against the Persons Act of Barbados fails to differentiate between intentional killings punishable by death, and intentional killings (not merely manslaughter or other lesser form of homicide)49 that would not be punishable by death. Rather, the Offences Against the Person Act “compels the indiscriminate imposition of the same punishment for conduct that can be vastly different”.50 55. Consequently, the Court considers that Section 2 of the Offences Against the Person Act of Barbados does not confine the application of the death penalty to the most serious crimes, in contravention with Article 4(2) of the Convention. A.2) The arbitrariness of the mandatory death penalty 56. The State argued that the imposition of its mandatory death penalty for the crime of murder in Barbados is not arbitrary, within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Convention, precisely because it is lawfully sanctioned, as opposed to “ad hoc executions administered 46 Cf. Case of the 19 Merchants V. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 5, 2004. Series C No. 109, para. 173; Case of Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.), supra note 40, para. 77, and Case of the Massacre of Pueblo Bello V. Colombia. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2006. Series C No. 140, para. 59. 47 Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al., supra note 42, para. 99, and Case of Raxcacó Reyes, supra note 37, para. 56. See also Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), supra note 7, para. 57. 48 Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al., supra note 42, para. 102. 49 Killings which otherwise would constitute murder in Barbados are subject to lesser punishments in the following areas: attempted murder, threatening murder through letters, conspiracy to murder, aiding suicide, acting in pursuance of a suicide pact and infanticide. Cf. Offenses Against the Person Act, supra note 38, ss. 2 and 9-14, (folios 2980 and 2983-2984). 50 Cf. Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al., supra note 42, para. 103.