52 2003”208, and (d) “[is] responsible, due to omission in the investigation of: (i)] the alleged threatening acts […] to the detriment of Carmen Teresa Omeara Miraval,” and (ii) “the alleged acts of forced displacement [ …] to the detriment of Carmen Teresa Omeara Miraval; Fabiola Álvarez Solano, and […] Elba [K]atherine Omeara Álvarez, Manuel Guillermo Omeara Álvarez and Claudia Marcela Omeara Álvarez.” 207. Given the State's acknowledgment of responsibility for the aforementioned aspects, the Court does not consider it necessary to examine them. It is relevant, however, to make two clarifications: one regarding the time elapsed in the investigations into Omeara Carrascal and Álvarez Sánchez and another regarding the violation of the Inter-American Convention against Torture in relation to the investigation into Omeara Miraval. 208. Regarding the time elapsed in the investigations into Omeara Carrascal and Álvarez Sánchez, taking into account the State's acknowledgment of responsibility and the fact that nearly 24 years have passed since the events occurred, the Court considers it unnecessary to review and examine the arguments regarding the violation of the reasonable time, since the unjustified delay is evident.209 209. In regards to the violation of the Inter-American Convention against Torture, regarding the investigation of Omeara Miraval, it should be noted that the State acknowledged having violated Article 8 in relation to the general obligation established in Article 1, but not Article 6 of said Convention, pointing out that it follows the obligation of Article 1 of the same treaty and that it did not breach that duty.210 In this regard, the Court recalls that in the first case in which it determined non-compliance with the aforementioned Convention,211 and subsequently on multiple occasions,212 it has carried out a joint examination of the three It should be clarified that the State's acknowledgment regarding the investigation on Omeara Carrascal does not include a consideration of the time of the investigation. Indeed, it is clear from the terms of said acknowledgment that when Colombia refers to the fact that only on July 31, 1998, the investigation was "connected" with another in progress, it accepts, in the State's understanding, a lack of diligence, but not an undue delay. The opposite is true with respect to the state's recognition of responsibility for the investigation into Álvarez Sánchez. This is because Colombia "acknowledge[d] its responsibility for not having initiated the investigation ex officio, and for the judicial inactivity that lasted from October 1994 to March 2003", all “while the first steps to clarify the facts […] took 9 years.” 209 Indeed, in the first case, from the State's recognition it can be deduced that Colombia, for nearly 4 years, did not actively investigate the events that occurred on January 28, 1994. In the second case, no relevant actions were carried out before of 2003. Similarly, in other cases the Court has not carried out a thorough examination of the reasonableness of the time elapsed in the investigations, when an unjustified delay in the initiation of the leading actions was evident (Cf. Case of Rodríguez Vera et al. (Disappeared from the Palace of Justice) v. Colombia, supra, paragraph 506, and Case of Terrones Silva et al. v. Peru, supra, paragraph 185). 210 In this regard, the State specified that "its acknowledgment of responsibility under Article 8 of the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture should not be understood as an acknowledgment of its responsibility under Article 6 of that same instrument." It explained that it understands that “Article 6 of the InterAmerican Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture develops the general obligation set forth in Article 1, establishing a specific obligation for the States Parties to classify the crime of torture in the domestic law, as well as the establishment of severe penalties proportional to severity, in accordance with the notion of torture enshrined in the treaty. In this way, since Article 6 contributes in a special and specific way to the development of the general obligation, an interpretation in accordance with which, any violation of the obligation to investigate automatically supposes a violation of the obligation to classify is not admissible.” It added that neither the representatives nor the Commission "develop[d] a specific charge for the violation of Article 6," and that the State has also complied with this norm, since at the time of the facts there was a constitutional prohibition of torture and this crime was classified in the Criminal Code, as well as "in Article 24 of Decree 180 of 1988, statute against terrorism, incorporated into permanent legislation by Extraordinary Decree 2266 of 1991." It added that “[t]he current Criminal Code, Law 599 of 2000” also classifies the crime and “that in the Colombian domestic sphere, torture is also a serious disciplinary offense. This is established in numeral 9 of article 48 of Law 734 of 2002”. 211 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of March 8, 1998. Series C No. 37, para. 136. 212 Cf., among others, Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, supra, para. 252, and Case of Favela Nova Brasília v. Brazil, supra, para. 258. 208