56. In this regard, this Court notes that a literal, systematic, teleological, and evolving interpretation of the scope of its competence leads to the conclusion that Article 26 of the American Convention protects the rights derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural provisions set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States (hereinafter the “OAS Charter”). It has also recognized that the scope of these rights must be understood in conjunction with the other provisions of the American Convention. They are therefore subject to the general obligations contained in articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention and can be subject to supervision by this Court, pursuant to the terms of article 62 and 63 of the Convention. This conclusion is not based solely on formal argumentation: it is the result of the interdependence and indivisibility of civil and political rights with economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights,69 as well as their compatibility with the objective and aim of the Convention, which is to protect the fundamental rights of human beings. In this sense, the Court has established that in each specific case requiring an analysis of Economic, Social, Cultural and Environmental Rights (hereinafter “ESCER”), it must be determined whether a human right protected by Article 26 of the American Convention is derived explicitly or implicitly and the scope of its protection.70 57. It must also be taken into account that human rights are interdependent and indivisible, and therefore, the hypothesis that ESCER are beyond the jurisdictional control of this Court—which in this case has been explicitly acknowledged by the state through its acknowledgment of responsibility (supra para. 18) is inadmissible. 58. This Court has held that the right to work is a right that is protected by Article 26 of the Convention.71 In relation to the foregoing, this Court has noted that articles 45(b) and (c) and articles 46 and 34(g) of the OAS Charter establish a series of provisions that The Court “has repeatedly maintained the interdependence and indivisibility of civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights, because they should all be understood integrally as human rights, without any specific hierarchy, and be enforceable in all cases before the competent authorities.” Cf. Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, supra, para. 141. 69 Cf. Case of Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala, supra, paras. 75 to 97; Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence v. Peru, supra, para. 34, and Case of Vera Rojas et al. v. Chile, supra, para. 33. 70 Cf. Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, supra, para. 145; Case of Dismissed Employees of Petroperú et al. v. Peru, supra, para. 192; Case of San Miguel Sosa et al. Venezuela, supra, paras. 219 and 220; Case of Spoltore v. Argentina, supra, para. 82; Case of the Employees of the Fireworks Factory of Santo Antonio de Jesus v. Brazil, supra, para. 68; Case of Casa Nina v. Peru, supra, para. 104; Case of the Miskito Divers (Lemoth Morris et al) v. Honduras, supra, para. 68; Case of Former Judicial Branch Workers v. Guatemala, supra, paras. 128 to 133; Case of Palacio Urrutia et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 153; Case of the national Federation of Maritime and Port Workers (FEMAPOR) v. Peru, supra, para. 107; Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 87. 71 19