due respect to opinions otherwise, restricting analysis of this case to civil rights seems to me to be an error that can and should be avoided. 47. At this point, it should be noted that the interdependence between the different generations of rights does not support the argument that the direct justiciability of ESCER is unnecessary. The Court's action will only be effective and transparent once all the reasons invoked in each case are explicitly and fully considered, with the construction of a line of argumentation that encompasses the entire plexus of rights violated. 48. Thus, what is clearly under development and still requires reflection as regards ESCER is not the now-settled possibility of immediate declaration of their violation but the development of techniques for reaching the decision that prioritize the dialogic method with domestic jurisdictions, especially in cases with large-scale and persistent harm to social, economic, cultural, or environmental rights nationally. 49. The instantaneity or not of the appeal, however, has nothing to do with the lack of abstract justiciability of the right set forth in Article 26. To think otherwise, with all due respect, is an error in the dogmatics of human rights. Hence, it makes no sense to change the case law on the full and immediate effectiveness of ESCER, in my assessment. 50. From another angle, realization of ESCER in individual cases like this one does not require a hermeneutic that is much different from the one used for civil and political rights (as the Court has demonstrated in this case). However, in the situations most difficult to resolve—where a collective or mass human rights violation has taken place—due to political obstacles or shortcomings in institutional coordination at the domestic level, the Court, in my opinion, has no reason to retreat or find that the right violated is not justiciable; Rather, it is enough to take due care and administer dialogical remedies—distinct from the democratic process—by assigning responsibilities and finding a need for economic and fiscal planning to implement the right withheld (in the case of an omission) or provide reparations (in the event of an action that amounts to a rights violation). Lastly, the compliance structure must provide for a continual dialogue between the Court and states, similar to what jurist Roberto Gargarella41 recommends for resolving domestic conflicts over complex constitutional rights. 51. However, these requirements as far as a special decision-making technique should in no way be mistaken for an unwanted return to a hands-off doctrine. Diametrically opposed to this, what this Court wants, from my perspective, is an effort of institutional imagination, permeable to some degree to experimentalism, such that at the conclusion of the transnational dialogue with the state in violation, full restoration of protection to some vulnerable ESCER is restored. Only then will the victims be placed in a status activus of full enjoyment of the rights protected by Article 26 of the Convention. 52. Lastly, with these precautions and reasonable collaboration with states— presumably, given their acquiescence to litigation before the Court—during the compliance with judgment phase, the tailored remedy will be more effective and not appear as merely comforting rhetoric or “evasive social therapy”42 offered by professional theorists. Escaping the temptation to perform “rationalizing legal GARGARELLA, Por una Justicia Dialógica. El Poder Judicial como Promotor de La Deliberación Democrática. Buenos Aires: Siglo Veintiuno, 2014, pg. 123. 41 UNGER, Roberto Mangabeira. O Direito e o Futuro da Democracia. Rio de Janeiro: Boitempo, 2004. pg. 107. 42 10