opinion on psychological coercion and evidence of Brisa's mental state (supra para. 65). In that regard, the Sentencing Court No. 2 asserted that “it cannot affirm whether [the] sexual intercourse constituted a consensual relationship or sexual assault […] because,” among other factors, “the victim [did not] refer to what the intimidation behaviors were that made her yield to her attacker.” Thus, it is noted that, when examining the nature of the sexual relations existing between a 16-yearold girl and a 26-year-old adult man who represented an authority figure for her, evidencing an asymmetry of power between the two, and with whom she also had a relationship of trust, the Trial Court did not consider it relevant to focus on the existence or not of consent on the part of Brisa or on the existence of an environment of coercion, by virtue of which her consent could not be inferred, “but in the reliable verification of the existence of violence or intimidation, eliminating at the same time the only evidence that would support said elements.”286 154. In this regard, this Court has indicated that reference cannot be made to the victims’ consent to have sexual relations when the aggressor holds a figure of authority over the victim (supra paras. 147 and 148), because it creates a power inequality that is aggravated by the age difference between the victim and the perpetrator. It is true that “what may seem like consent on the part of the victim can be invalidated precisely because of the power inequalities in the relationship that materialize in submission on the part of the victim.”287 In view of the above, it is considered that the application of the reference law and its interpretation by the domestic courts resulted in the denial of justice to a girl who was a victim of sexual violence, such as Brisa. 155. In turn, the criminal offense of statutory rape,288, as included in Bolivian legislation, creates a hierarchy between sexual crimes that reduces the visibility and severity of sexual violence committed against children and adolescents289 and does not consider the importance of the concept of consent. Furthermore, incidences are restricted only to cases of “seduction or deception” in which the victim's capacity for consent would be compromised or would be non-existent. This ignores other possible particular conditions of vulnerability of the victim and conceals relationships based on power asymmetries.290 Consequently, this Court understands that the criminal offense of statutory rape, as it was and is provided for in the legislation of Bolivia, is incompatible with the American Convention,291 as, in any hypothesis of sexual intercourse with a person between 14 and 18 years of age, without 286 Cf. Expert opinion of Sylvia Mesa Peluffo during public hearing, supra. 287 Cf. Expert opinion of Sylvia Mesa Peluffo during public hearing, supra. The term “statutory rape” in the Bolivian legal system, and in most Latin American legal systems, is different from its use in Portuguese in Brazil. According to Ms. Šimonović's expert opinion, the definition of statutory rape in most Latin American countries refers to cases in which an adult has sexual relations with a minor who is already of legal age for consent, through seduction or deception. In Brazil, on the other hand, the term “statutory” is used to describe the act of coercing someone, through violence or serious threat, to have carnal access or another libidinous act, which is a definition very similar to what most countries understand as “rape”. Cf. Expert opinion of Dubravka Šimonović, supra, (evidence file, folio 11486 to 11486). 288 289 Cf. Written version of the expert opinion of Sylvia Mesa Peluffo, supra (evidence file, folio 11657), Expert opinion of María Elena Attar Bellido, supra (evidence file, folio 11554), Expert opinion of Dubravka Šimonović, supra (evidence file, folio 11485). 290 Expert witness Attar Bellido argued that “it is important to emphasize that in cases in which there is abuse of a relationship of trust or authority or in a circle of trust due to blood, spiritual or family ties of affection, sexual violence against [girls, children and adolescents] cannot be classified as statutory rape and the facts cannot be assessed within the framework of “seduction or deception” - even if the aggravating circumstance of article 310 of the [Criminal Code] is applied - because it would imply a minimization of the seriousness of the sexual violence to this group that deserves enhanced protection, therefore, from a gender perspective and in this context of abuse of a relationship of trust or authority, sexual violence must be classified as rape against children and adolescents.” Cf. Expert opinion of María Elena Attar Bellido, supra (evidence file, folio 11556). According to expert witness Mesa Peluffo, “the crime of statutory rape […] is a criminal concept with gender bias, which should have been eliminated if the State had complied with the obligation imposed by Article 7(e) of the Belém do Pará Convention. The existence and adequate application of laws that strongly punish sexual violence and especially incest is an essential deterrent to establishing a culture of non-tolerance, with which Bolivia does not comply, so it would be necessary for the State to harmonize its legislation with the Belém do Pará Conventions, the Rights of the Child and CEDAW.” Cf. Expert opinion of Sylvia Mesa Peluffo, supra. 291 51