father will be presumed as regards his role in relation to the child, or even that the father was not interested in providing care and well-being to the child.78 95. Regarding the alleged circumstances of the situation after the birth, the first instance judge referred to the absence of a mother, that the father did not know his daughter, and also that he was not married. In this regard, the judge did not indicate what real and proven risk arises from raising a child in a single-parent or extended family, or determine why the absence of the mother in the specific case would, as he stated, “harm [the] mental and undoubtedly the physical health” of the child.79 Furthermore, the first instance judge who granted the legal guardianship considered Mr. Fornerón to be the only relative of M, even though Mr. Fornerón’s mother, the child’s grandmother, appeared before the judge to offer to take care of the child. 96. The considerations of the first instance judge also reveal a preconceived idea of what it is to be a single parent, because Mr. Fornerón’s capacity and possibility of fulfilling the role of father was questioned and conditioned to the existence of a wife. The single status of Mr. Fornerón, compared by one of the judges to “the absence of biological family,” used as grounds for legally depriving him of performing his role as a father, constitutes the denial of a basic right based on stereotypes about the capacity, qualities or attributes required to exercise single parenthood, without considering the specific characteristics and circumstances of the father who wishes, alone, to fulfill his role as a father. 97. In this regard, expert witness García Méndez stated before the Court: The first instance decision indicating that this child could not be restored to her father because […] he does not constitute a family, [did not consider] the Convention on the Rights of the Child, or [… domestic] case law, which [reflects the fact that] Argentina is a progressive country in this regard. Domestic law contains no indication that this family must […] be composed of the [father] and the [mother], […] this is not in international law or in the laws of Argentina. To the contrary, […] Argentina has been a leader in recognizing different types of family organization; […] it is also one of the States that has the best record in this regard. 98. The Court has stated previously that the American Convention does not establish a closed concept of family and, in particular, it does not protect only a “traditional” model of the family. 80 In addition, the Inter-American Court has established that the term “family members or next of kin” should be understood in its broadest sense, including all those persons connected by a close relationship.81 There is nothing to indicate that single-parent families cannot provide children with care, support and affection. Every day, the reality 78 In this regard, one of the Chamber judges indicated: “[M] was born of the relationship between [Mr.] Fornerón and her mother […] and I consider that it is not for us […] to assess whether they were in love. The father’s claim is legitimate and, if the contested criteria were shared, numerous paternity suits, for example, would be unsuccessful. [… Mr. Fornerón] had nothing to do with the surrender of the newborn [and] cannot be prejudiced […] because he has not formed a family with [Ms.] Enríquez, and […] the mother’s lack of love for her daughter does not mean that the same applies to the father[. H]e consider[s] that the denial, as it is conceived, is not only excessive, but also a kind of punishment for an inexistent omissive conduct.” Judgment of the First Court of the Second Chamber of Paraná of June 10, 2003, supra note 36, folio 137. 79 In this regard, the said Chamber judge indicated: “The excuse that, if the child were to be surrendered to the father, the mother would be absent, is also unacceptable, [particularly, when Argentine adoption laws] establish that no one can be simultaneously adopted by more than one person, unless the adoptive parents are married. Judgment of the First Court of the Second Chamber of Paraná of June 10, 2003, supra note 36, folios 137 and 140. 80 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, supra note 51, para. 69 and, similarly, Case of Atala Riffo and daughters v. Chile, supra note 50, para. 142. 81 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-17/02, supra note 51, para. 70, and Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Reparations and costs. Judgment of November 27, 1998. Series C No. 42, para. 92. 29