12 up again, in the present Concurring Opinion, the exam of this specific aspect, since it has already been the object of my extensive considerations – to which I make reference here – in my Concurring Opinion in the case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. v. Peru (Perliminary Objections, Judgment of 09.04.1998), as well as in my Concurring Opinions in the case of the "Street Children " (Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment of 05.26.2001), and of Goiburú et al. v. Paraguay (Judgment of 09.22.2006), and in my Concurring Opinions in the Provisional Protection Measures in the case of Eloísa Barrios et al. v. Venezuela (Order of 06.29.2005), of the Community of Paz de San José de Apartadó v. Colombia (Order of 02.02.2006), and of the Communities of Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó v. Colombia (Order of 02.07.2006). III. The Expansion – and not the Restriction – of the Condition of Victim under the American Convention. 39. I have introduced, within this Court, the reasoning for the expansion of the notion of victim for the effects of reparations, in order to include the next of kin (of fatal victims) in their own right (Concurring Opinions in the case of Blake v. Guatemala [merits and reparations, 1998 and 1999] and of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala [merits and reparations, 2000-2002). When holding this thesis, I did so based on the discovery of human suffering, that is, based on the express acknowledgment of the centralization of the suffering of the victims within the framework of International Human Rights Law (my Concurring Opinions, v.g., in the cases of the "Street Children " (Villagrán Morales et al) v. Guatemala [reparations, 2001], Bulacio v. Argentina [2003], Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru [2004], Tibi v. Ecuador [2004], Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay [2006], Ximenes Lopes v. Brazil [2006]).46 I have even insisted on the configuration of the notion of victim also within the scope of provisional protection measures (my Concurring Opinions, v.g., in the cases of Eloísa Barrios et al. v. Venezuela [2005], Community of Paz de San José de Apartadó v. Colombia [2006], Communities of Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó v. Colombia [2006]).47 40. In the present case of La Cantuta v. Peru (Interpretation of Judgment, 2007), I find myself in the obligation to once more defend the reasoning I had introduced in the Court, and that was already a part of its constant jurisprudence, with regard to the expansion of the notion of victim under the American Convention of Human Rights, - due to a recent and regretful setback introduced by the Court in its Judgment (of merits and reparations, of 11.29.2006) in the present case of La Cantuta. In said Judgment, the Court stated that "both the Inter-American Commission and the representatives [of the victims] identified several brothers and sisters of the executed or disappeared persons as alleged victims of the violation of Article 5 of the Convention. However, in several of those cases, the evidence produced was insufficient to enable the Court to establish actual damage to said next of kin. Accordingly, the Court only considers victims those siblings in respect of Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (1986) pages 5-78. . Cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, "Fragmentos de Primeras Memorias de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos", in Jornadas de Derecho Internacional (Buenos Aires/Argentina, November 2006), Washington D.C., OAS/Subsecretariat of Legal Affairs, 2007 (in press). 46 . For the texts of my Opinions quoted here, cf. A.A. Cançado Trindade, Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos - Esencia y Trascendencia (Votos en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 1991-2006), 1a. ed., México, Edit.Porrúa/Universidad Iberoamericana, 2007, pages 156-169, 186-204, 211-223, 321-330, 363-374, 251-267, 417-432, 444-456, 694-723, 748-765, 952-958, 976979, and 980-983. 47