Rico was in a position to foresee that the cause of repeated non-compliance with the duties inherent to the post is related to the main functions that he must perform as a judge, and that undoubtedly the holding of hearings or the casting of votes in various cases are part of those duties. In this sense, this Court does not find that the Impeachment Jury made evident and notorious use of a discretion incompatible with the degree of foreseeability that the rule must have, or that it had materialized in an arbitrary decision in violation of the principle of legality contained in Article 9 of the Convention. b. Cause contained in Article 21(e), on reiterated demonstrated in the exercise of official duties incompetence or negligence 107. Regarding the cause contained in Article 21(e), on incompetence or negligence in the exercise of official duties, it was proven that Mr. Rico requested his colleagues to abstain from intervening in cases in which he himself had been recused. According to the considerations of the Impeachment Jury, the substance of the act arose from the evidence in several files added to the proceeding, in which Mr. Rico repeatedly requested his colleagues to refrain from intervening in cases in which attorney González Rubio was acting, because he had recused the alleged victim in those cases, indicating that Mr. Rico had "lost his jurisdiction" because he understood that the deadlines for issuing a judgment had expired.64 108. On this point, the Court notes that the behaviors that were imputed to Mr. Rico and that were considered proven refer to inappropriate conduct in the exercise of his position as a judge. In this sense, the Court understands that when Mr. Rico challenged his colleagues to refrain from intervening in the cases in which he himself had been challenged, it was accessible and foreseeable to him that this could constitute a form of incompetence or negligence in the exercise of his functions. Therefore, this Court does not find that the Impeachment Jury had made evident and notorious use of a discretion incompatible with the degree of foreseeability that the rule must have or that it had materialized in an arbitrary decision in violation of the principle of legality contained in Article 9 of the Convention. c. Cause contained in article 21(k), reiterated allowance of procedural deadlines to lapse without pronouncing on the matters submitted for a decision or an opinion 109. Finally, the Jury found with respect to the cause contained in Article 21(k) (reiterated allowance of procedural deadlines to lapse without pronouncing on the matters submitted for a decision or an opinion) that Mr. Rico allowed procedural terms to expire for the issuance of judgments, and that he ruled after the parties had made claims for prompt delivery.65 In the Court's opinion, there is no doubt that the wording of Article 21(k) is unequivocal, and that the cause refers to precise and determined situations. In the specific case, the Jury found that Mr. Rico had allowed procedural terms to lapse, a situation that corresponds to the type of sanction provided for in Article 21(k) of Law 8085. Consequently, the Court concludes that the State did not violate the principle of legality in relation to this ground. B.2. Mr. Rico's Right to participate in government 110. With regard to the allegation of violation of Mr. Rico's right to participate in government, this Court finds that it does not refer to an autonomous violation, but would derive from a violation of other rights alleged in this case. Consequently, the Court refers to its considerations on the rights to judicial guarantees, to judicial protection and on the principle 64 65 Cf. Votes of the Impeachment Jury of June 15, 2000 (evidence file, folios 9 to 173). Cf. Votes of the Impeachment Jury of June 15, 2000 (evidence file, folios 9 to 173). -26-