105. Regarding the first requirement, strict legality, the Court has established that restrictions must be previously established by law to ensure that these are not left to the discretion of the public authorities. Thus, the criminal definition of a given conduct must be clear and accurate, 115 particularly when it concerns matters of criminal law and not of civil law.116 106. On the second aspect, that is, the permitted or legitimate purposes, Article 13(2) of the Convention refers to this point. While the present case concerns the restriction of the right to freedom of expression by means of a complaint filed by a private citizen, the Court will consider only the purpose specified in subparagraph (a) of that Article, namely respect for the rights or reputation of others. 107. The Court has considered that, in pursuit of this legitimate end, it is necessary that the State weigh up the right to freedom of expression of the communicator and the right to honor of the person affected.117 Furthermore, the State has the obligation to provide a judicial remedy so that any person who considers that his honor has been harmed can demand protection.118 108. Finally, as regards the proportionality and necessity of the measure, the Court has understood that any restriction imposed on the right to freedom of expression must be proportionate to the interest that justifies it, and closely tailored to the accomplishment of that legitimate purpose, interfering as little as possible with the effective exercise of that right.119 In that sense, it is not sufficient to have a legitimate purpose; the measure in question must also respect the principles of proportionality and necessity in restricting freedom of expression. In other words, “this last step of the examination, must consider whether the restriction is strictly proportionate, in a manner such that the sacrifice inherent therein is not exaggerated or disproportionate in relation to the advantages obtained from the adoption of such limitation.”120 109. For its part, the European Court of Human Rights, in interpreting Article 10 of the European Convention, concluded that the term "necessary", while not synonymous with "indispensable", implies the existence of a “pressing social need” and that for a restriction to be "necessary" it is not enough to show that it is "useful", "reasonable" or "desirable." 121 This concept of “pressing social need” was adopted by the Inter-American Court in its Advisory Opinion OC-5/85.122 110. Having considered the content of the right to freedom of thought and expression, and the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic system, and having established the requirements for ensuring that any restrictions to that right are compatible with the American Convention, the Court will now analyze the facts of this case. B.3. The case of Mr. Álvarez 111. In considering the case of Mr. Álvarez, the Court will first examine the nature of his comments in the article published in the newspaper “Así es la Noticia.” It will then consider Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, para. 77. Mutatis Mutandis, Cf. Case of Fontevecchia and D’amico v. Argentina. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 29, 2011, Series C, No. 238, para. 89. 117 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, para. 51; and Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru, para. 100. 118 Cf. Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, para. 125. 119 Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, para. 123; and Case of Claude Reyes et al. v. Chile, Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 19, 2006, Series C, No. 151, para. 91. 120 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, para. 83. 121 Cf. ECHR, Case of The Sunday Times, para. 59. 122 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism, para. 46. 115 116 22