117. Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that Mr. Álvarez’s statements made reference to matters of public debate that warrant protection under the right to freedom of expression. Therefore, in this case the Court must consider whether the imposition of subsequent liability to which Mr. Álvarez was subjected complied with the requirements of Article 13(2) of the Convention. B.3.b. Subsequent criminal liability to which Mr. Álvarez was subjected 118. In this case, the purpose of the criminal proceedings instituted against Mr. Álvarez was to protect the honor and reputation of a public servant who resorted to legal action to defend himself. The Court has previously indicated that statements concerning public officials and other individuals who perform duties of a public nature should be accorded a certain latitude in the broad debate on matters of public interest. However, this does not, by any means, signify that the honor of public officials or public figures should not be legally protected.129 119. Article 13(2) of the American Convention states that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression shall not be subject to prior censorship, but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability. Although, this provision does not establish the nature of the liability to be imposed, in its jurisprudence this Court has indicated that criminal prosecution is the most restrictive measure to freedom of expression; therefore in a democratic society, its use should be exceptional and be reserved for those eventualities in which it is strictly necessary to protect fundamental legal interests from attacks that may harm or endanger them. To do otherwise, would result in the abusive exercise of the punitive power of the State.130 120. In other words, from the array of possible measures available to impose subsequent liability for the potential abusive exercise of the right to freedom of expression, criminal prosecution will only be appropriate in exceptional cases where it is strictly necessary to protect a pressing social need. 121. It is understood that in the case of speech that is protected because it concerns matters of public interest, such as the conduct of public officials in the performance of their duties, the State’s punitive response through criminal law is not conventionally appropriate to protect the honor of an official. 122. Indeed, the use of criminal law against those who disseminate information of this nature would directly or indirectly constitute intimidation which, in the end, would limit freedom of expression and would impede public scrutiny of unlawful conduct, such as acts of corruption, abuse of authority, etc. Ultimately, this would weaken public controls over the State’s powers, causing grave damage to democratic pluralism. In other words, in the hypothesis outlined previously, the protection of honor through the criminal law, which may be legitimate in other cases, is not consistent with the Convention. 123. In this order of ideas, the Court understands that the legal definition of offenses against honor in cases of investigative reports by journalists requires careful interpretation. In this sense, it is important to emphasize that from each definition of a crime or offense, a prohibitory norm is inferred, as a logical exercise that makes it possible to determine a proscribed social sphere. However, it is not sufficient, based merely on the norm adduced from that legal definition, to establish this sphere, because prohibitory legal norms form part Cf. Case of Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, para. 128; and Case of Palamara Iribarne v. Chile. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 22, 2005. Series C No. 135, para. 82. 130 Cf. Case of Kimel v. Argentina, para. 76; Case of Mémoli v. Argentina, para. 139. 129 24