right to defense by limiting his access to certain evidence and limiting the time to prepare the defense (Article (8)(2)(c); and, iv) undue restrictions on the testimony of a witness (Article 8(2).(f)). B.1. Procedural defects in the presentation of the accusation 146. With regard to procedural defects in the presentation of the accusation (complaint or criminal accusation), the Court notes that Mr. Willian Lara did indeed file a “complaint” before the Thirty-Sixth Trial Court of Caracas (supra para. 38), which declined its jurisdiction. The petition was subsequently reassigned to the Seventh Trial Court, which asked the plaintiff to remedy the procedural errors in the private prosecution in accordance with current law (supra para. 40). The foregoing description of the facts does not suggest that a formal violation of due process occurred, since the Venezuelan Judiciary acted in accordance with procedural law, by transferring the initial petition to the competent court and requiring the plaintiff to correct the accusation. Therefore, the Court concludes that the representatives have not proven a violation of due process in this respect. B.2. Impartiality of the judges 147. With respect to the impartiality of the judicial authorities, the representatives presented two types of arguments. First, they claimed that the provisional status of the judges and their replacement prior to the trial hearings demonstrated a lack of judicial independence. They also argued that several actions by the Seventh Trial Court during the criminal proceedings that resulted in the conviction of Mr. Álvarez, particularly the rejection of the evidence offered, would suggest the partiality of the judge, in violation of Article 8 of the American Convention. 148. The Court recalls that States are required to guarantee the independence of provisional judges and, therefore, should grant them a certain degree of stability and permanence in office, given that to be provisional is not equivalent to being discretionally removable from office. Indeed, the Court considers that the provisional nature of the appointments should not modify in any manner the safeguards instituted to guarantee the good performance of the judges and to ultimately benefit the parties to a case. Furthermore, provisional appointments should not be extended indefinitely in time and should be subject to a condition subsequent, such as a predetermined deadline or the holding and completion of a public competitive selection process, whereby a permanent replacement for the provisional judge is appointed. Provisional appointments should be the exception, rather than the rule. Thus, when provisional judges are in office for a long time, or the majority of judges are provisional, this situation creates major obstacles for the independence of the judiciary. This situation of vulnerability of the judiciary is compounded when there are no processes for removal from office that are respectful of the international obligations of States. 140 Likewise, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that the dismissal of judges by the executive, before the expiry of the term for which they have been appointed, without any specific reasons given to them and without effective judicial protection being available to contest the dismissal, is incompatible with the independence of the judiciary. 149. However, the Court notes that in this case there are no allegations concerning the transfer or removal of judges, only of temporary substitutions of the judges in charge of the criminal proceedings. Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Contentious Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008, Series C, No. 182, para. 43; and Case of Chocrón v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2011. Series C, No. 227, para. 116-117. 140 29