sanctioned in Article 444 of the Criminal Code, with the aggravating factors established in clauses 5, 7 and 14 of Article 77. For those reasons, the State argued that given the particular circumstances of this case, Tulio Álvarez was considered a flight risk. 170. The State further argued that the measure barring the defendant from leaving the country was not absolute. It merely required that the exercise of the right to free movement be subject to prior authorization by the court. Thus, on several occasions, the court permitted the presumed victim to travel outside of Venezuela during the criminal proceedings. It also mentioned that the ban on leaving the country was a legitimate restriction of the right to movement, pursuant to Article 256 161 of Venezuela’s Organic Code of Criminal Procedure. B. Considerations of the Court 171. Article 22(2) of the American Convention establishes that “[e]very person has the right to leave any country freely, including their own,” and Article 22(3) states: “The exercise of the foregoing rights may be restricted only pursuant to a law to the extent necessary in a democratic society to prevent crime or to protect national security, public safety, public order, public morals, public health, or the rights or freedoms of others.” 172. In this regard, the Court has established that the right to movement and residence, including the right to leave the country, may be subject to restrictions, pursuant to Articles 22(3) and 30 of the Convention. 162 However, in establishing such restrictions States must observe the requirements of legality, necessity and proportionality. 163 173. In particular, the Court has indicated that the State must define precisely and clearly by law, the exceptional circumstances under which a measure such as the restriction to leave the country is admissible. In this regard, “the lack of legal regulation prevents such restrictions from being applied, because neither their purpose nor the specific circumstances under which it is necessary to apply the restriction to comply with some of the objectives indicated in Article 22(3) of the Convention have been defined. It also prevents the defendant from submitting any arguments he deems pertinent concerning the imposition of this measure. Yet, when the restriction is established by law, its regulation should lack any ambiguity so that it does not create doubts in those charged with applying the restriction, or the opportunity for them to act arbitrarily and discretionally, interpreting the restriction broadly.”164 174. Regarding the requirement of legality in restrictions to the rights to freedom of movement, of residence and to leave the country, the Court finds that this was established in Venezuelan legislation. Therefore, the legal provision applied by the Seventh Trial Court on December 15, 2004 existed in law (supra para. 43). 175. Secondly, the Court recalls that precautionary measures that affect the defendant’s personal freedom and right to movement are of an exceptional nature, since they are limited by the right to presumption of innocence and the principles of necessity and proportionality, imperative in a democratic society. Similarly, precautionary measures cannot be a substitute Article 256(4) of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure: “Modalities. Provided that the grounds for pretrial detention can be reasonably satisfied through the use of another measure less burdensome to the defendant, the competent court, on its own motion or at the request of the Public Ministry or of the defendant, shall instead impose, through a well-reasoned decision, one of the following measures: […] 4. The prohibition against unauthorized travel outside the country, the local district in which the defendant resides, or the geographical area identified by the court.” 162 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C, No. 111, para. 117; and Case of Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of December 1, 2016. Series C, No. 330, para. 141. 163 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, para. 123; and Case of Andrade Salmón v. Bolivia, para. 141. 164 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, para. 125; and Case of Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, para. 134. 161 34