25 Command also designed and ordered the implementation of a military campaign codenamed “Victoria 82,” in which they used new strategic definitions within the counterinsurgency framework and the objectives of the “National Security and Development Plan.” 60 The CEH stated that “[t]his program carried out scorched earth operations as a way of putting an end to the social base of the insurgent movement.” 61 The massacres or “scorched earth operations” were concentrated in the regions of Quiché, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Alta and Baja Verapaz, the country’s southern coast and Guatemala City. 62 According to the CEH, around 626 massacres attributable to the Guatemalan Army and State security forces were carried out, with acts of extreme cruelty aimed at eliminating individuals or groups of people “defined as enemies” and at “terrorizing the population.” 63 The terror provoked by the massacres and the devastation of entire villages between 1981 and 1983 triggered a mass exodus of a diverse population, the majority of which was made up of Maya communities, but which also included a significant number of ladino families. The CEH estimated the number of displaced people at between 500,000 and 1.5 million people during that period. 64 79. At the time of the internal armed conflict, the forced disappearance of persons in Guatemala was also a State practice carried out mainly by agents of its security forces. 65 The purpose of this practice was to dismantle movements or organizations that the State identified as sympathetic to the “insurgency” and to spread terror among the population. 66 Likewise, the CEH concluded that “rape was a generalized and systematic practice carried out by State agents in the context of the counter-insurgency strategy” in which the percentage of female victims reached 99% of recorded cases, and was used as a weapon of war. Cases of individual or selective rape occurred in the context of the detention of victims and were often followed by their death or disappearance. 67 In addition, during and prior to the aforementioned massacres or “scorched earth operations,” members of the State security forces perpetrated massive or indiscriminate public rapes, sometimes accompanied by killings of pregnant women and the induction of abortions. This practice was aimed at destroying women’s dignity at the cultural, social, family and individual levels. 68 Furthermore, during this period there was a practice of Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 42.4. Cf. CEH, “Guatemala, Memory of Silence”, Chapter 2, para. 2973. 62 Cf. Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, para. 57, and Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 42.5. 63 Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 42.6; Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, para. 57, and Report “Guatemala, Memory of Silence”, Chapter 2, paras. 3077, 3086, 3105, 3128 and 3177. The State security forces included the Army, the Civil Defense Patrols (hereinafter the “PAC”), the Military Commissioners, the Treasury Guard, the Military Police, the National Police, the Judicial Police (known as “judiciales”) and the “death squads.” Cf. Case of Molina Theissen v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of May 4, 2004. Series C No. 106, para. 40.3. The PACs emerged in the early 1980s as groups of civilians coercively formed by the armed forces. In April 1983, Governmental Agreement 222-83 granted them legal recognition through the creation of the National Directorate of Coordination and Control of Civil Self-Defense. Their main objectives were to organize the civilian population against the guerilla movements and to achieve control over them, for which purpose they had an institutional relationship with the Army, carried out activities to support the functions of the armed forces, received funding, weapons, training and direct orders from the Army, and operated under their supervision. In short, the civil patrols acted as agents of the State during the time of the armed conflict. These patrols were legally disbanded in 1996. Cf. Case of Blake v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of January 24, 1998. Series C No. 36, para. 76, and Case of Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 42.28. The Judicial Police was a branch of the National Police responsible for “the investigation, persecution and capture of criminals and the prevention of crimes.” Its members were popularly known as “judiciales.” Towards the mid-1960s, the intervention and control of the Army in the police began to manifest itself. Cf. CEH, “Guatemala, Memory of Silence”, Chapter 2, paras. 1159 and 1164. 64 Cf. Case of Chitay Nech et al. v. Guatemala, para. 123, and CEH, “Guatemala, Memory of Silence”, Chapter 4, para. 66. 65 Cf. Case of Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala. Merits. Judgment of November 25, 2000. Series C No. 70, para. 132, and Case of García and Family Members v. Guatemala, para. 54. 66 Cf. Case of Molina Theissen v. Guatemala. Merits, para. 40.1, and Case of García and Family Members v. Guatemala, para. 120. 67 Cf. CEH, “Guatemala, Memory of Silence”, Chapter 2, paras. 2351, 2352, 2376 and 2464. 68 Cf. Case of the Plan de Sánchez Massacre. Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 19, 2004. Series C No. 116, para. 49.19, and Case of the Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, para. 60. 60 61