40 Consequently, it concluded that the State violated the right to psychological and moral integrity and the right to protection of the family, enshrined in Articles 5(1) and 17 of the American Convention in relation to the duty to respect rights established in Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of the next of kin of the victims in this case. 126. In their pleadings and motions brief, the representatives maintained that the State is responsible for the forced disappearance of eighteen individuals who lived in the village of Chichupac and the neighboring communities. In their final arguments they indicated that, based on the judgment in the case of the Peasant Community of Santa Bárbara v. Peru, it is necessary to modify the legal classification of what happened to the victims - who were presented before the Commission as victims of extrajudicial execution – to the category of forced disappearance, because there are insufficient elements to establish their death. In this regard, they requested that the eight persons identified by the Commission in its Merits Report be declared victims of forced disappearance. They also requested the change of legal definition of what happened to a list of 68 alleged victims provided at the public hearing and a list of 42 alleged victims provided in their final written arguments, from extrajudicial execution to forced disappearance. They noted that to date the whereabouts of many of the people who appear on these lists remains unknown, their identities have not been determined with certainty and their remains have not been found or delivered to their relatives for burial. Furthermore, although in some cases exhumations have already begun, the remains have not been identified through tests or analyses that prove their identity, the manner and cause of death and the existence of possible injuries or signs of torture. 127. On the other hand, the representatives pointed out that an important aspect of the systematic practice of forced disappearance is the psychological and moral effects on the families of the victims, which results from the profound suffering caused by the failure to locate the mortal remains of their loved ones, as well as the failure to investigate the circumstances under which the crime occurred. Therefore, they argued a violation of Article 5 of the American Convention, in relation with Article 1(1) thereof. 128. The State argued that it cannot be held responsible for the disappearances that occurred at the time of the armed conflict, since this crime was not classified under domestic criminal law nor did it exist in the inter-American sphere itself. It argued that neither the Court nor the Commission distinguished between “continuing crimes” and “permanent crimes” when analyzing the legal nature of the crime of forced disappearance. It explained the difference between such crimes under Guatemalan criminal law, and indicated that forced disappearance, which in Guatemala constitutes a crime as of May 22, 1996, is a permanent crime because it is committed at a specific time and, although the effects remain, it cannot be re-classified based on subsequent events in accordance with the principle of legality and non-retroactivity of the law. Consequently, the facts that occurred prior to the criminalization and entry into force of the crimes of forced disappearance and torture, could be considered as crimes of kidnapping, unlawful detention or serious injuries. 129. The State added that only a judge with criminal jurisdiction can establish the existence of a forced disappearance. Moreover, it pointed out that “the State cannot be held responsible for having committed such disappearances without any reliable evidence.” In this regard, it held that, in order to establish forced disappearance, both the Commission and the Court relied solely on the systematic pattern prevalent at the time of the internal armed conflict. It also argued that when there is a change of government, although State responsibility can be extended for the acts of officials of previous governments, those acts cannot be characterized as a continuous conduct by the State and consequently the Court’s jurisdiction cannot be extended to acts prior to the date on which the State recognized its jurisdiction. Likewise, it held that the ICFDP cannot be applied retroactively to acts that occurred before it entered into force for the State, nor to acts that began to be executed prior to the ratification of said Convention on February 25, 2000. 130. Similarly, the State argued that it cannot be held responsible for the violations of the rights