55 177. To begin with, the Commission notes that the decisions ordering the victims’ dismissal contain a description of the conduct for which they incurred disciplinary blame; that description is followed by a paragraph listing a long series of articles from various laws. The Commission notes that the drafting of the decision of dismissal -described in the Section of Established Facts-, makes it impossible to distinguish the articles containing the grounds for disciplinary action from those that concern the functions and powers vested in the authorities who participated in the disciplinary proceeding, those that refer to the rules of procedure of the proceeding, or even the rules of due process. 178. The Commission has already alluded to the implications that a simple recitation of the articles can have for the duty to state grounds and for the alleged victims to be able to properly exercise their right of defense before the Judicial Career Council. For purposes of the principle of legality, the Commission must point out that a simple reading of the decisions ordering the victims’ dismissal will not suffice to establish the connection between the articles listed in the decisions to dismiss and the conduct attributed to the victims. The Commission is of the view that the non-specific use of disciplinary rules and the lack of clarity as to how the facts of each case would fit each of the provisions cited constitute a violation of the principle of legality. b. Precision in stating the grounds 179. Secondly, of the articles cited, the Commission has been able to establish that at least the following concerned guidelines for or restrictions on the conduct of judicial officials: i) from the Constitution: 319 (invoked in the decisions concerning Magistrate Tirza Flores and judges Chévez de la Rocha and López Lone) and 323 (invoked in the decision ordering dismissal of Judge López Lone); ii) from the Judicial Career Service Act: 44 (invoked in the decisions concerning Judges López Lone and Chévez de la Rocha and Magistrate Tirza Flores); 45 (invoked in the decisions concerning Judge López Lone and Magistrate Tirza Flores); 53(g) (invoked in the decisions concerning judges López Lone and Chévez de la Rocha and Magistrate Tirza Flores); 54(c) (invoked in the case of Magistrate Tirza Flores); 55 (invoked in the decisions ordering dismissal of judges López Lone and Chévez de la Rocha and Magistrate Tirza Flores); iii) from the Regulations Governing the Judicial Career Service Act, articles 149 (cited in the decisions to dismiss each of the alleged victims); 157 (cited in the decisions dismissing Magistrate Flores Lanza and Judge Barrios); 172 (f) (cited in the decisions to dismiss each of the alleged victims); 173 (c) (cited in the decisions to dismiss Judge Barrios and Magistrate Flores Lanza); 174 (cited in the decisions to dismiss each of the alleged victims); iv) from the Law on the Organization, Functions and Authorities of the Courts: Article 3 (1) (cited in the decision to dismiss Judge Chévez); 4 (cited in the decision to dismiss Judge Chévez de la Rocha), 3 (6) (cited in the decision to dismiss judges López Lone, Barrios and Chévez de la Rocha); 108 (cited in the decisions to dismiss Magistrate Flores Lanza and Judge Barrios); v) from the Code of Ethics for Judicial Officials and Employees: 1(1)(d) (cited in the decisions to dismiss judges Chévez and Barrios and Magistrate Flores Lanza), 1(1)(f) (cited in the decisions to dismiss judges López Lone and Chévez de la Rocha), 2 (d) (cited in the decisions to dismiss judges Chévez and Barrios and Magistrate Flores Lanza), 2(f) (cited in the decision to dismiss Judge Chévez de la Rocha), and 8(a) (cited in the decisions to dismiss each of the alleged victims); from the Statute of the IberoAmerican Judge, articles 10 and 20 (cited in the decisions to dismiss each of the alleged victims). 180. The Commission observes that a number of the articles cited do not contain a clear and precise definition of what the punishable conduct would be, thereby preventing judges from comporting themselves in such a way that they do not incur any of the grounds for dismissal. In these decisions, the Supreme Court cited grounds such as observing “irreproachable conduct, in private and in public, at all