59 3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions. […] 194. As determined in the section on established facts, judges Guillermo López Lone, Luis Alfonso Chévez de la Rocha and Ramón Barrios and Magistrate Tirza del Carmen Flores Lanza were subjected to disciplinary proceedings because they expressed, through various means, their opposition to the coup d’état that happened in Honduras on June 28, 2009. As a result of the disciplinary proceedings, the Honduran SCJ removed the alleged victims from their seats on the bench; the Judicial Career Council later reinstated Judge Barrios. 195. The petitioners alleged that these disciplinary sanctions constituted a violation of the alleged victims’ right to freedom of expression. In general terms, the petitioners argued that judges do not, because of the office they hold, forfeit their right to express their views; their argument was that the subsequent imposition of liability for exercise of this right should be clearly spelled out in the law, be calculated to achieve a legitimate purpose and be necessary in a democratic society. They pointed out that the alleged victims’ actions were not among the conduct subject to sanction listed in the Honduran legislation and that the majority of the laws cited as the basis for the dismissals are “broad and ambiguous” and allow for “arbitrary interpretations.” They also indicated that the sanctions served no legitimate purpose; instead, their purpose was “to prevent judges from continuing to raise questions about the regrettable role that the Honduran SCJ played, to send an intimidating message to the professional association of judges, further undermining judicial independence.” The petitioners also alleged that sanctions were unnecessary in a democratic society, because “commentary of this type was important and necessary for democracy given the events unfolding in Honduras at the time.” The context was such that the alleged victims thought that speaking out was not just their right but also their duty. 196. The petitioners added that the State’s action is also a violation of Article 13(3) of the American Convention, since the disciplinary proceedings to which the alleged victims were subjected were in themselves an indirect means “of silencing the stream of criticism of what the justices of the SCJ have done since the coup d’état, and provoking self-censorship.” 197. The petitioners also alleged that the case brought against Judge Guillermo López Lone was also a violation of the right to peaceful, unarmed assembly recognized in Article 15 of the American Convention, “because he was being disciplined for his participation in peaceful demonstrations that opposed the coup d’état and in support of constitutional order.” They argued that for Judge López, “exercising this right was an essential means of expressing criticism of the activities of the Honduran authorities at that time.” They added that while Judge Chévez de la Rocha did not participate in the demonstration for which he was disciplined, even if he had, those activities are permitted under the right protected in Article 15 of the Convention. 198. The State, for its part, maintained that the sanctions against the alleged victims were imposed because “they engaged in conduct that, under the Honduran legal system, is prohibited conduct because of their role as judges.” It asserted that “public servants in the judicial branch – especially judges and magistrates- are not just any citizens” and that their freedom of expression “is curtailed by the limitations imposed by the domestic laws governing their judicial status.” The State