65 214. Following this same line of reasoning, the IACHR states that in every case in which a violation of the duty to exercise prudence was alleged because of a judge’s participation in a matter of public interest that is not at issue in a case over which said judge is presiding, a careful assessment must be done to determine whether the expression of opinion affected the judge’s independence and impartiality to such an extent as to warrant a disciplinary sanction. It is up to the State to prove that the purpose of the limitations imposed is to protect these principles and that they have no other hidden agenda; that they have been interpreted narrowly, as they constitute an exception to the general principle whereby freedom of expression is a right guaranteed to every person equally, and is especially protected in the case of speech on matters of public interest.298 As the European Court of Human Rights has written in its case law, “freedom of expression is subject to a number of exceptions which, however, must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established.”299 Also, as previously observed, when speech concerning the State or matters of public interest is concerned, the examination of the need for and proportionality of the restrictions on a judicial official’s right to freedom of expression must be more rigorous. 215. Given this framework of legal principles, the IACHR will now examine the subsequent liability imposed in this specific case. 2. Limitations imposed in the specific case. 216. Based on the foregoing considerations, the IACHR will now determine whether the disciplinary proceedings and the sanctions imposed on the alleged victims are a restriction of their right to freedom of expression as judicial officials and, if so, if that restriction meets the necessity test that the American Convention establishes for the purpose. 217. The Commission observes that the facts and grounds cited for the alleged victims’ removal, and which triggered the disciplinary proceedings against them, are different from case to case. The Commission will therefore examine each particular case separately. a. Adán Guillermo López Lone 218. As previously established, Judge López Lone underwent disciplinary proceedings for alleged violation of a number of provisions of the Honduran legal system. After spending almost a year facing disciplinary proceedings, on May 5, 2010 the SCJ, en banc, decided to order Judge López Lone’s dismissal on the grounds that he “h[ad] taken active part in the political demonstration held on July 5, 2009,” in violation of the provisions of Article 319 of the Constitution and Article 3(6) of the Law on the Organization, Functions and Authorities of the Courts. The decision also stated that “no judge may claim a right to participate in the national political discourse like any other citizen, precisely because judges 298 Cf. I/A Court H.R. Case of Tristán Donoso v. Panama. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009. Series C No. 193, paragraph 114. In this case, the Court held that where the Court held that “[t]he American Convention guarantees this right to every individual, irrespective of any other consideration; so, such guarantee should not be limited to a given profession or group of individuals. Freedom of expression is an essential element of the freedom of the press, although they are not synonymous and exercise of the first does not condition exercise of the second. The instant case involves a lawyer who claims protection under Article 13 of the Convention.” 299 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Pitkevich v. Russia, judgment of February 8, 2001.