61 maintain discretion and exercise prudence for the sake of safeguarding the principles of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. In fact, these principles, recognized in many international treaties and statements of principles,282 are fundamental if the democratic system is to function properly. Protection of these principles may necessitate subsequent imposition of liability to members of the judicial branch for abusing their right to free speech. The United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary recognized that “[…] members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”283 Likewise, Principle 4.6 of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct provide that “[a] judge, like any other citizen, is entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but, in exercising such rights, a judge shall always conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”284 203. Nevertheless, the jurisprudence constante of the Inter-American Court and the InterAmerican Commission has been that such limitations must be the exception and to be admissible, three preconditions derived from Article 13(2) of the Convention must be met: (1) the limitation must have been precisely and clearly defined through formal and material law; (2) the limitation must be designed to achieve imperative objectives authorized by the American Convention; and (3) the limitation must be necessary in a democratic society, adequate to meet the objective it pursues, and strictly proportional to the end sought. 204. Thus, administrative punitive systems that allow for subsequent imposition of liability on a judge for exercising his or her right to freedom of expression must follow the requirements derived not only legitimate but, at times, it is also a duty of the state authorities.” (I/A Court H.R. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, paragraph 131) Suffice it to point out that the legal functions and authorities of public officials, particularly the highest ranking public officials in the executive branch, include special duties directly or indirectly related to the exercise of their right to freedom of expression, namely: (1) a special duty to reasonably verify the facts on which their statements are based; 2) a duty to ensure that their statements do not amount to human rights violations and, in particularly, do not violate the rights of those who contribute to the public discourse by expressing and imparting their ideas, such as journalists and human rights defenders; (3) a duty to ensure that their statements do not interference with the Independence and autonomy of the judicial authorities; (4) a duty to respect the confidentiality of certain information in the State’s possession, within the framework established by Article 13(2) of the Convention, and (5) a special duty to denounce human rights violations (IACHR, Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 2009, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.Doc. 51, December 30, 2009, Chapter III, paragraphs 202 et seq) 282 See, in this regard, the United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary (adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan, Italy, August 26 to September 6, 1985, and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 40/32 of November 1985 and 40/146 of December 3, 1985); Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14); the Statute of the Ibero-American Judge, adopted by the VI Ibero-American Summit of Chief Justices of the Supreme Courts and Supreme Tribunals of Justice, held in Santa Cruz de Tenerife, the Canary Islands, Spain, May 23-25, 2001; American Convention on Human Rights (articles 8, 59 and 71); European Convention on Human Rights (Article 6), and others. 283 Principle 8, United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in Milan, Italy, August 26 to September 6, 1985, and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 40/32 of November 1985 and 40/146 of December 3, 1985. 284 Principle 4.6, Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, approved by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in its resolution E/CN.4/2003/65/Annex, as revised at The Hague, the Netherlands, November 2002 and adopted on January 10, 2003.