73 248. As is apparent, although Judge Chévez’ ultimate removal was not technically a dismissal, the Judicial Career Council’s decision has materially identical effects, and was based –as it was in the SCJ’s decision- on the judge’s expression of his opinion. The Council’s decision further maintains that the alleged victim made “slanderous and defamatory” statements. Here lies the limitation or restriction of Judge Chévez de la Rocha’s right to freedom of expression. Hence, the Commission will now proceed to examine whether that limitation or restriction is legitimate under the American Convention. 249. To begin with, in its decision not to restore Judge Chévez de la Rocha to his office, the Judicial Career Council cited Article 69 of the Judicial Career Service Act, under which “[a] judicial servant removed from his post without justified cause shall have the right to be reinstated to his or her post […] or to receive compensation […] if his or her reinstatement is deemed impossible or inadvisable in the Judicial Career Council’s decision.” 250. In the opinion of the IACHR, the authority that this law gives to disciplinary bodies to refuse to reinstate a judge when it is deemed “inadvisable” is excessively broad and open-ended, and therefore at variance with the precision and predictability that the American Convention demands for the removal of a judge in the judiciary. As previously noted, a decision that terminates a judge because of his or her exercise of the right to freedom of expression must be subject to the strictest test of legality, to safeguard not just the alleged victim’s right to freedom of expression and right of assembly, but also the principles of the autonomy and independence of the judiciary that are cornerstones of the democratic system of government and the rule of law.312 In the instant case, the ample margin of discretion allowed under this law gave the disciplinary body the authority to order the alleged victim’s de facto removal, ignoring all the guarantees that a disciplinary system affords. In effect, this provision gives the State authority the power to determine the grounds or reasons for separating a judge from his office, making it impossible for the judicial official to reasonably foresee what the prohibited conduct is, which is patently incompatible with the principle of legality and due process. The IACHR understands that in some circumstances the State may not be able to reinstate a public servant, but such circumstances should be foreseeable and objectively determinable, so that the official is protected against arbitrary abuses of power. 251. The untenable degree of discretion that the excessively vague language of this provision allows is clear from the reasons why the Council deemed that the alleged victim’s reinstatement in his post as a Special Anti-Domestic Violence Judge was inadvisable: his opposition to the coup d’état in Honduras and his criticisms of the Honduran SCJ’s role in these events. More specifically, it was because of his alleged feelings of “shame for working in the Judicial Branch” after it was involved in the events associated with the coup d’état. Thus, the excessive ambiguity and breadth of Article 69 of the Judicial Career Service Act gave the disciplinary authority some kind of generic authority to impose liability for the exercise of freedom of expression, in patent violation of the requirement of strict legality and to the detriment of Judge Chévez de la Rocha. 252. Regarding the application of Article 53 of the Judicial Career Service Act, which provides that “[t]he following shall be considered acts by officials and employees that are inimical to the dignity of the administration of justice: b) slanderous or defamatory statements against the institutions or against any public servant or public official, the IACHR notes that in its decision the Judicial Career Council does an accounting of the rights compromised and recognizes how disproportionate the 312 IACHR, Report No. 30/97, Case 10.087, Merits, Gustavo Carranza, Argentina, September 30, 1997, paragraphs 41, 58. IACHR, Report No. 48/00, Case 11.166, Merits, Walter Humberto Vásquez Vejarano, Peru, April 113, 2000, paragraph 76.