76 intimidating message to the professional association of judges, further undermining judicial independence.” The question the Commission has to answer is whether, given the context, the Magistrate’s prosecution for broad and ambiguous cause and then actually removing her from office for a significant part of that time, disproportionately affected her right to freedom of expression, in violation of the American Convention. 261. The IACHR has written that the mere fact of subjecting someone to criminal proceedings in application of a law that is contrary to the provisions of articles 13(2) and 9 of the American Convention and in which the person faces the prospect of an extraordinarily severe sanction may in itself constitute an unlawful violation of the right to freedom of expression.317 Likewise, the InterAmerican Court has written that the restriction of rights -like the right to leave the country- during proceedings in which the defendant is accused of offenses that carry penalties, constitutes a violation of the right to freedom of expression, no matter what the outcome of the case.318 Similarly, the Commission has maintained that when slander and defamation proceedings are brought against the persons who have filed complaints with the competent authorities concerning acts that in their view constituted punishable offenses committed by public servants in the performance of their functions, public scrutiny is discouraged and it has an obvious inhibiting effect that noticeably affects democratic oversight in violation of Article 13 of the Convention. The Commission has written that it is only natural, for example, that complaints of serious human rights violations might offend the honor or reputation of the person who turns out to be involved in those violations; hence enforcement of criminal laws that punish slander and defamation may act as a deterrent to such complaints, out of fear of legal reprisals.319 262. Based on the evidence presented by the parties in this case, the Commission finds that in the context of the coup d’état in Honduras (infra paragraphs XX), disciplinary proceedings were instituted against Magistrate Flores Lanza and lasted two years. They were based on a provision in the law that, in vague and broad terms, established sanctions for slander and defamation. The process took a disproportionate toll on the alleged victim’s judicial career and personal life and had an undeniable chilling effect on the exercise of her right to freedom of expression. As the facts established show, for a two-year period the Magistrate had to endure a disciplinary proceeding for having filed a criminal complaint in which she expressed her opinion on events that, in her view, constituted crimes. This process, at least with respect to the slander and defamation charges, was conducted under a law that is incompatible with the principle of strict legality, which prevented the Magistrate from knowing, to a certainty, precisely what illicit conduct was being attributed to her. She also had to devote time and resources to preparing her defense, within a disciplinary proceeding riddled with due process violations and violations of her right of access to justice (infra paragraph XX). Also, the Council delayed a year to decide the challenge she filed against the SCJ’s decision, during which time she had to endure the effects of the decision to remove her from office, which involved the loss of salary and social benefits. 317 Cf. IACHR, Report No. 88/10, Case 12.661, Merits, Néstor José and Luís Uzcátegui et al., Venezuela, July 14, 2010, paragraph 279. 318 Cf. I/A Court H.R. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Judgment of August 31, 2004, Series C No. 111, paragraph 117 et seq 319 Cf. IACHR, Report No. 88/10, Case 12.661, Merits, Néstor José and Luís Uzcátegui et al., Venezuela, July 14, 2010, paragraph 279.