17 VI CONTEXT 40. The Court will now establish the context in which the facts of the instant case took place based principally on the Report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador.28 A. The armed conflict 41. From approximately 1980 to 1991, El Salvador was submersed in an internal armed conflict29 of which it is estimated that more than 75,000 members of its population were victims.30 42. The year 1980 marked the beginning of “indiscriminate attacks against the noncombatant civilian population and collective summary executions that affected the rural population in particular.” In the early 1980s, the violence in the rural areas “was extremely indiscriminate.” In addition, “[t]he appearance of organized terrorism, through the so-called death squads, became the most abhorrent practice in the steadily increasing violence.” These were groups of heavily armed individuals, usually in civilian clothing, who acted clandestinely and concealed their affiliation and identity. 43. Between October and November 1980, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front, (hereinafter also “FMLN”) was formed from five armed resistance and political opposition groups: the Popular Liberation Forces, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People, the Armed Liberation Forces, the National Resistance Armed Forces and the Revolutionary Party of the Workers of Central America. In 1981, the FMLN organizations decided to launch an offensive to promote a popular uprising and overturn the governing Junta. Although it did not achieve its goal, the FMLN ended up controlling several populated areas, consolidated its areas of political influence, and achieved international recognition as a fighting force. 31 44. Meanwhile, the United States of America significantly increased its military and economic assistance to El Salvador at the time, including such resources as “training, modernizing and expanding the structure in the number of troops of the Armed Forces.” It was in this context that the Immediate Response Infantry Battalions were created, such as the Atlacatl Battalion in March 1981. These were specially trained anti-guerrilla units that had concluded their training with the advisory services and support of United States military personnel. 45. The counterinsurgency military operations resulted in a high loss of life in the noncombatant civilian population and gave rise to the concept of “displacement.” In its most extreme form, the counterinsurgency found expression in the extended concept of “draining the water from the fish”; in other words, destroying the insurgency’s support base. The inhabitants of areas where there was a strong presence of the FMLN “were equated with the 28 Cf. Report of the Truth Commission for El Salvador: from Madness to Hope, the 12-year war in El Salvador, 1992-1993 (evidence file, volume III, attachment 3 to the application, folios 1889 to 2101). 29 Cf. Case of the Serrano Cruz sisters v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of March 1, 2005. Series C No. 120, para. 48(1). 30 Cf. United Nations. El Salvador Accords: on the road to peace, 1992 (evidence file, volume IV, attachment 6 to the pleadings, motions and evidence brief, folio 2623). 31 Cf. United Nations, Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Mission to El Salvador. UN Doc. A/HRC/7/2/Add.2, 26 October 2007 (evidence file, volume IV, attachment 8 to the pleadings, motions and evidence brief, folio 3188).