the parties to the case, as well as to the citizens in a democratic society. Personal or subjective impartiality is to be presumed unless there is evidence to the contrary consisting, for example, in the demonstration that a member of the court or the judge has personal prejudices or biases against the litigants. Meanwhile, the so-called objective impartiality consists in determining whether the judge in question has offered sufficient elements of conviction to exclude any legitimate misgivings or well-grounded suspicion of bias.235 132. Article 8(2) of the Convention establishes that “[e]very person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law.” In the criminal sphere, the Inter-American Court has indicated that the principle of presumption of innocence constitutes a cornerstone of judicial guarantees.236 The presumption of innocence means that the accused does not have to prove that he has not committed the offense of which he is accused, because the burden of proof corresponds to the accuser.237 Moreover, the accused must have the benefit of the doubt. Thus, authoritative proof of guilt is an essential requirements for a criminal conviction, and the burden of proof falls on the accuser and not on the accused. 238 In addition, the principle of presumption of innocence means that judges do not initiate the trial with a preconceived idea that the accused has committed the offense with which he is charged. 239 133. The Court has also indicated that gender stereotyping refers to a preconception of attributes, conducts or characteristics possessed by, or the roles that are or should be performed by, men and women, respectively. The Court has pointed out that it is possible to associate the subordination of women to practices based on socially dominant and socially persistent gender stereotypes. In this regard, their creation and use become a cause and consequences of gender violence against women, conditions that increase when they are reflected, implicitly or explicitly, in policies and practices, particularly in the reasoning and language of state authorities.240 Indeed, even if the use of any type of stereotype is common, it becomes harmful when it limits an individual’s capacity to develop their personal abilities or becomes a violation or violations of human rights.241 The Court also underlines that the use of stereotypes by the judicial authorities in their actions may indicate a lack of impartiality.242 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Disputes”) v. Venezuela, supra, para. 56, and Case of Ríos Avalos et al. v. Paraguay, supra, para. 119. 235 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador. Merits, supra, para. 77, and Case of Amrhein et al. v. Costa Rica, supra, para. 387. 236 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 154, and Case of Herrera Espinoza et al. v. Ecuador, supra, para. 192. 237 Cf. Case of Zegarra Marín v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 15, 2017. Series C No. 331, para. 123. The Human Rights Committee of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has ruled similarly. Human Rights Committee. General Comment No. 32, The right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (vol. I)), para. 30. 238 Cf. Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores v. Mexico, supra, para. 184, and Case of Rodríguez Revolorio et al. v. Guatemala, supra, para. 109. 239 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”)v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No. 205, para. 401, and Case of Guzmán Albarracín et al. v. Ecuador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 24, 2020. Series C No. 405, para. 188. 240 Cf. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Background paper on the role of the judiciary in addressing the harmful gender stereotypes related to sexual and reproductive health and rights, p. 2. Available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Women/WRGS/JudiciaryRoleCounterStereotypes_EN.pdf 241 Cf. CEDAW, General recommendation No. 33 on women’s access to justice, CEDAW/C/GC/33, August 3, 2015, paras. 26 to 28, and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Background paper on the role of the judiciary in addressing the harmful gender stereotypes related to sexual and reproductive health and 242 41