of one of its international obligations.40 In this regard, it is undeniable that, as indicated in one of my separate opinions,41 there is no inter-American or international legal provision, either in a convention or by international custom or general principle of law, that recognizes abortion as a right. There are only resolutions of international bodies – most of them composed of international officials and not of representatives of States – resolutions that, moreover, are not binding and do not interpret valid international law, but rather reflect aspirations that the latter be amended in the sense they suggest. 14. To the foregoing, it should be added that although it is true that the Commission indicates that the provisions on abortion form part of the facts of the case, 42 it is not true that they form part of the context of the case. This consists of the Commission’s considerations but not that these are applicable, especially when such provisions are cited in relation to a context that falls outside the purpose of the case, which relates to aggravated homicide and the punishment for this that was applied to the victim, and not to abortion. This same commentary is also valid with regard to the mentions made in the judgment to resolutions of international bodies with regard to abortion.43 15. It should also be recalled that the Court has not directly stated that abortion would be a right. It has only indicated that “the embryo cannot be understood to be a person,” that “conception […] occurs at the moment when the embryo becomes implanted in the uterus” and that “the protection of the right to life [… is] gradual and incremental according to its development.”44 All of which could evidently be used as an argument to promote recognition of abortion as a right. On this basis, the undersigned expressed his discrepancy in his corresponding dissenting opinion.45 16. Lastly, it is necessary to stress the circumstance that none of those who intervened in this case – that is, victims, State and Commission – included an opinion on abortion in their respective briefs submitted to the Court. In this regard, it could be said that the judgment incurred in ultra petita. 17. Based on the above, it may be concluded that the allusions to abortion in the judgment are inappropriate and unnecessary, and even weaken the arguments that it includes on the unlawful nature of the State’s conduct with regard to the victim in this case. Eduardo Vio Grossi Judge Pablo Saavedra Alessandri Secretary Art. 2 of the draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, annex to (AG/56/83). 40 Dissenting opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2012. 41 42 Supra, footnote 32. 43 Paras. 42 and 43. Case of Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 28, 2012, para. 264 44 45 Supra, footnote 41. 6