15 66. The consensus here is that although that are a number of institutions working together to advance the cause of women, they have superimposed mandates and therefore weak state coordination 65 and little in the way of funds to carry out their programs. Partial acknowledgement of responsibility 67. The State acknowledged responsibility for the lack of due diligence in the investigation conducted into the death of María Isabel Véliz Franco, by virtue of its failure to conduct certain forensic tests on the body; the delay in the investigation caused by the dispute over jurisdiction in the case, and by its failure not to take an effective precautionary measure to ensure the presence of Osbel Airosa as a 66 suspect in the murder. 68. In the hearing that the Commission held on the case, the State acknowledged “in principle” its blame for “various shortcomings and weaknesses throughout the investigation process,” but 67 said that these were structural problems of the State. It asserted that at the time the events occurred, there were no guidelines for the case’s investigation or criminal prosecution. The Public Prosecutor’s 68 Office established those guidelines in 2006. 69. According to the State, failure to conduct the series of tests that were not done before the body was removed from the scene of the crime would be punishable today, as guidelines do now exist. It added that at the time, the tests and the autopsy were not done according to international standards, but that there are now guidelines in place for setting the course and theory of an investigation in practice. The State gives its assurances that all potential suspects named by the petitioners have been investigated; in 69 one case, a witness does not want to identify the persons that would presumably be involved. 70. As for the character assassination of the victim, it gave assurances that it was not the State that spread those comments and, from what they say, those comments do not appear in its reports. In other words, any deficiencies the case file may seem to have, like character assassination, are not a 70 position of the State and have never been used by it as an argument. 71. The State acknowledged that there were measures that were either not done or not done on time, but nonetheless maintains that it was in constant contact with Mrs. Franco, which helped it build 71 its plan of investigation. 72. The IACHR will now proceed to determine whether the authorities acted with due diligence in investigating what happened to María Isabel Véliz Franco. V. ANALYSIS OF LAW A. Right to life (Article 4), in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention 65 See, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights. Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of Human Rights in Guatemala, E/CN.4/2006/10/Add.1, February 1, 2006, paragraph 22; Gender Perspective: Violence against Women, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Yakin Ertürk, Addendum, Mission to Guatemala. E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.3, February 10, 2005. 66 The State’s communication of August 12, 2009, Ref. P.1008-09-RDVC/LZ/eh 67 IACHR, Hearing Minutes No. 5, Case 12.578, María Isabel Véliz Franco, Guatemala, March 20, 2009. 68 IACHR, Hearing Minutes No. 5, Case 12.578, María Isabel Véliz Franco, Guatemala, March 20, 2009. 69 IACHR, Hearing Minutes No. 5, Case 12.578, María Isabel Véliz Franco, Guatemala, March 20, 2009. 70 IACHR, Hearing Minutes No. 5, Case 12.578, María Isabel Véliz Franco, Guatemala, March 20, 2009. 71 IACHR, Hearing Minutes No. 5, Case 12.578, María Isabel Véliz Franco, Guatemala, March 20, 2009.