105. For its part, the United Nations Special Rapporteurship on the independence of judges and lawyers has made important analyses regarding the accountability of judges, the possibility of holding them accountable, and the safeguard of their independence. In this regard, it has indicated that “[i]nternational and regional standards recognize that no disciplinary action can be instituted against a judge as a consequence of the content of her or his decisions, differences in legal interpretation or judicial mistakes.”116 In this regard, the Special Rapporteur at the time considered the following: In order to safeguard the independence of justice operators, accountability mechanisms and proceedings must therefore have a restricted application. […] judges should not be removed or punished for bona fide errors or for disagreeing with a particular interpretation of the law. […] justice operators should be held accountable for instances of professional misconduct that are gross and inexcusable and that also bring the judiciary into disrepute. However, in order to ensure the independent exercise of their functions, they should not be subject to disciplinary proceedings or sanctions relating to the content of their rulings, verdicts, or judicial opinions, judicial mistakes or criticism of the courts.117 106. The Court also notes that, in keeping with the aforementioned standards, Article 70(2) of the American Convention provides a safeguard for the autonomy of the judges of this Court; the text of the article reveals an interpretation standard to ensure judicial independence in the terms of the Convention. Thus, the provisions established that “[a]t no time shall the judges of the Court […] be held liable for any decisions or opinions issued in the exercise of their functions.” 107. Consequently, the Court considers that the guarantee of the independence of the judiciary requires that, when instituting impeachment proceedings against judicial officials, the organ or organs that intervene in their processing, deliberation and decision are prohibited from reviewing the grounds for, or the contents of, the decisions of those authorities. Also, the impeachment or the eventual removal of a judge as a result of this procedure cannot be founded on the content of the decisions that he or she has issued, in the understanding that the protection of judicial independence prevents inferring responsibility owing to the votes and opinions issued in the exercise of the jurisdictional function,118 with the exception of intentional violations of the law or proven incompetence. 108. To the contrary, judicial authorities could be subject to undue interference in the exercise of their functions, in evident detriment to the independence they should necessarily be ensured in order to fulfill their vital role under the rule of law effectively. B.3. Analysis of the specific case 109. The Court will now examine what happened in the impeachment proceedings that culminated in the removal of the presumed victims from their functions as justices of the Supreme Court of Justice of Paraguay. To this end, it will analyze, first, the grounds for instituting the impeachment proceedings and, then for deciding to dismiss them. Second, it General Assembly. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Diego GarcíaSayán, UN Doc. A/75/172, July 17, 2020, para. 21. The Special Rapporteur has also indicated that “judges should in principle be immune from criminal proceedings in relation to the content of their orders and judgments.” General Assembly. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Diego García-Sayán, UN Doc. A/72/140, July 25, 2017, para. 101. 117 Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, UN Doc. A/HRC/26/32, April 28, 2014, paras. 84 and 87. In her analysis, among other documents, the Special Rapporteur cited the Kyiv Recommendations on Judicial Independence in Eastern Europe, South Caucasus and Central Asia of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which indicated that the: “[d]isciplinary responsibility of judges shall not extend to the content of their rulings or verdicts, including differences in legal interpretation among courts.” 118 Cf. Expert opinion of José Ramón Cossío Díaz, provided during the public hearing before this Court, and written expert opinion of Roberto P. Saba (evidence file, volume VI, affidavits, folio 13293). 116 29