15 Declaration”)32, which considers that it is important to reaffirm and develop principles governing behavior of all persons, groups, and authorities in situations of internal violence, ethnic, religious and national conflicts, disturbances, tensions and public emergency; as well as to confirm that certain standards can never be derogated in such situations; for the following reasons: Considering that situations of internal violence, disturbances, tensions and public emergency continue to cause serious instability and great suffering in all parts of the world; Concerned that in such situations human rights and humanitarian principles have often been violated; […] Recognizing the importance of respecting existing human rights and humanitarian norms; Confirming that any derogations from obligations relating to human rights during a state of public emergency must remain strictly within the limits provided for by international law, that certain rights can never be derogated from and that humanitarian law does not admit of any derogations on grounds of public emergency; Confirming further that measures derogating from such obligations must be taken in strict conformity with the procedural requirements laid down in those instruments, that the imposition of a state of emergency must be proclaimed officially, publicly, and in accordance with the provisions laid down by law, that measures derogating from such obligations will be limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, and that such measures must not discriminate on the grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, social, national or ethnic origin[.] 52. The Court considers that once a military intervention with such a wide scope and based on purposes as broad and vague (supra para. 48) has been carried out, the suspension of guarantees which took place in the instant case and which was admitted by the State through its acknowledgement of responsibility for the alleged violation of Article 27 of the Convention, exceeded the powers attributed to the States by the Convention in the first section of this provision. Although the facts of the instant case only refer to the enforcement of the said DecreeLaw No. 86 - and the Court limits its analysis to this context – it is of the outmost importance to remind that suspension of guarantees must be used as a strictly exceptional mean to face real situations of emergency “to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation”, and not as a mean to fight common crime. Thus, the Court views favorably the State’s declaration to the effect that it is currently “in the process […] of democratizing […] the regime of exception[, which] will be duly regulated and strictly monitored […] in the next Constitutional Assembly to take place in Ecuador[, … in order to] limit […] the indiscriminate use of state[s] of exception which can sometimes be made due to the Executive’s power to decree a state of emergency”. * * * 53. Regarding the material scope of the suspension of guarantees, the Court will analyze Article 27(2) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 2 thereof, over which the dispute has remained open (supra para. 16). 54. The Court considers that the State has the obligation to ensure that the indispensable judicial guarantees for the protection of rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention remain in “Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards” (“Turku Declaration”), Adopted by an expert meeting convened by the Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, in Turku/Åbo (Finland), 30 November – 2 December 1990 and subsequently reviewed in a meeting of the Norwegian Institute of Human Right celebrated in Oslo (Norway) on September 29-30, 1994. United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, 51º Period of Sessions, Topic 19 of the provisional program, Report of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities on its 46º Period of Sessions. 32