19 the only mean by which a victim, or other persons in the absence of any victim, could take part in the trial – within the means by which an examining magistrate must initiate military criminal proceedings to hear punishable acts. Such assertion has not been disputed by the State. 66. Regarding military jurisdictions, the Court reminds that: [such courts] should have a restrictive and exceptional scope, bearing in mind that they should only judge members of the armed forces when they commit crimes or misdemeanors that, owing to their nature, affect rights and duties inherent to the military system.48 In this regard, when the military justice system assumes jurisdiction over a matter that should be heard by the ordinary justice system, the right to have a case tried by the appropriate judge is affected.49 This guarantee of due process should be examined taking into account the object and purpose of the American Convention, which is the effective protection of the individual.50 For these reasons, and due to the nature of the crime and the rights and freedoms damaged, the military criminal jurisdiction is not the competent jurisdiction to investigate and, if applicable, prosecute and punish the perpetrators of human rights violations51. 67. Certainly, the decree-law establishing the state of emergency did not stipulate the suspension of the right to life, which is in dispute in the instant case, nor did it stipulate the suspension of “the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights” (Article 27(2) of the Convention). However, considering that such decree-law was declared within the framework of the National Security Law, the rules stipulated in such Law would have applied if an investigation had been initiated in criminal courts, whether military or ordinary, as it should have happened at the moment the alleged victims were deprived of their lives (infra paras. 88-90, 109-110). These rules would result in the infringement of the right to be heard by a competent judge of either the individuals who would have committed a criminal act punishable with detention during a state of emergency, or those who would have been affected by such act or their family members. Such rules might also hinder the appropriate and independent control of the compatibility of the suspension of guarantees with the Convention and would hinder the participation of individuals or their family members in the proceedings. 68. Regarding the State’s allegations about the alleged lack of legal effects of special and military jurisdictions (supra para. 61), the reading of both Article 191 and the sixteenth transitory provision of the 1998 Ecuadorian Constitution suggests that “jurisdictional unity” was established, so that “all the magistrates and judges which depend on the Executive Branch would move to the Judicial Branch and, as far as the laws do not stipulate anything different, they will observe their own organic laws [and t]his provision includes military, police and juvenile judges”. The State did not demonstrate that, effectively, the said National Security Law had been modified by these provisions, nor did it demonstrate the way in which such decision would rectify the incompatibilities emerging from the application of this law, as exposed in the previous paragraphs. Besides, according to information submitted to the case file by the representatives in their final arguments and not disputed by the State, this National Security Law, which is in force since August 9, 1979, would have been amended five times since the facts in the instant case took place, the last time being in June 2003, five years after proclaiming the Constitution presently in force. Moreover, in their brief on pleadings and motions the representatives presented documentation showing that between April 2005 and March 2006, the State issued at least six decree-laws in which a state of Cf. Case of Durand and Ugarte, supra note 35, para. 117. See also Case of the Rochela Massacre, supra note 7, para. 200, and Case of La Cantuta, supra note 7, para. 142. 48 Cf. Case of Castillo-Petruzzi et al., supra note 40, para. 128. See also Case of the Rochela Massacre, supra note 7, para. 200, and Case of La Cantuta, supra note 7, para. 142. 49 Cf. Case of the 19 Tradesmen. Judgment of July 5, 2004. Series C No. 109, para. 173. See also Case of the Rochela Massacre, supra note 7, para. 200. 50 51 Cf. Case of La Cantuta, supra note 7, para. 142. See also Case of the Rochela Massacre, supra note 7, para. 200.