75. In the instant case, the Court notes that, as occurred with Ms. Habbal, the failure to notify Monnawar Al Kassar, Hifaa Al Kassar and Natasha Al Kassar of the decision to institute proceedings against them, and the fact that they were denied the possibility of being heard, receiving legal assistance and appealing the decision, meant that they were unaware of the existence of the expulsion proceedings and the reasons why the authorities had taken such action, and were prevented from exercising their right to a defense. In addition, the Court recalls that the State has special obligations to protect children in immigration proceedings (supra, para. 66). It was therefore due to the State’s omissions that the expulsion proceedings were not handled by an official specializing in cases involving children, and the alleged victims were denied the possibility of taking part in the different procedural stages, and submitting their case to a competent authority for review. 76. On this point, the Court deems it pertinent to recall that, particularly in the case of children, based on Articles 8(1) and 19 of the American Convention, decisions taken in the context of immigration proceedings must explain in detail the way in which the opinions expressed by the child were taken into account and also the way in which her or his best interest was assessed. 108 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has also highlighted the close relationship between the best interests of the girl or boy and the right to be heard, stating that “there can be no correct application of article 3 [(best interest)] if the components of article 12 are not respected [(right to participate and have their views considered)].” 109 Similarly, “article 3 reinforces the functionality of article 12, facilitating the essential role of children in all decisions affecting their lives.” 110 77. This Court notes that Resolution 1088 did not consider the impact that the expulsion could have on Monnawar Al Kassar, Hifaa Al Kassar and Natasha Al Kassar, and in that sense failed to assess the children’s best interests or properly state the reasons for the decision according to this principle. In addition, the Court notes that the decision failed to consider the particular circumstances of Mohamed Al Kassar, the brother and son of the alleged victims, who at the time of the events was less than one year old and had been born in Argentina. Although Resolution 1088 did not order Mohamed Al Kassar’s expulsion, the authorities failed to consider how the expulsion of his mother and sisters would affect his family life. The Court holds that, even though the child was not part of the proceedings, the immigration authorities should have taken into account the impact that the expulsion would have on Mohamed Al Kassar, and explained the reasons for their decision. 78. Thirdly, the Court recalls that measures depriving people of their liberty, including those ordered in the context of immigration proceedings, must be strictly necessary to protect fundamental legal rights from more serious attacks and should not be used for punitive purposes. Consequently, as can be deduced from what has already been noted (supra, paras. 61 to 64), detention for immigration purposes must be in accordance with the essential content of Article 7 of the Convention, which protects the freedom of individuals against unlawful or arbitrary interference. In particular, the Court emphasizes that Article 7(3) of the Convention protects people from arrests that are unreasonable, unpredictable, or disproportionate (supra, para. 63). In this case, the Court notes that Resolution 1088, which 108 Cf. Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra, para. 139. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 12: The right of the child to be heard, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/12, July 20, 2009, para. 74. 109 110 Advisory Opinion OC-21/14, supra, para. 139, and Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 12: The right of the child to be heard, supra, para. 74. 26