submitting the case to the Court pursuant to Article 35 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure; to the requirements that must be met regarding the accreditation of the alleged victims’ representatives; and to the existence of human rights violations as a result of the State’s acts or omissions. Since these are matters that do not affect the Court’s jurisdiction to hear this case, the Court holds that the preliminary objections presented by the State are inadmissible. 23. However, the Court deems it pertinent to point out, with respect to the State’s first preliminary objection (supra para. 15), that Article 35(1) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure establishes that, for a case to be examined by the Court, the alleged victims must be identified in the report referred to in Article 50 of the Convention. The Court notes that, in its Merits Report, the Commission clearly identified the alleged victims in this case, namely: Raghda Habbal, Monnawar Al Kassar, Hifaa Al Kassar, Natasha Al Kassar, and Mohammed René Al Kassar. The Court also recalls that its Rules of Procedure do not require compliance with any other formalities for submitting a case related to the identification of the alleged victims. 24. The State also alleges that the representatives are not authorized to speak on behalf of the alleged victims. In this regard, the Court notes that, on February 24, 1993, Ms. Habbal, through Mr. S.F.G.C., granted attorneys Carlos Varela Álvarez, Diego Jorge Lavado and Alejandro Omar Venier the power to represent her “in the territory of the Argentine Republic in any act, procedure, case or administrative proceedings before any state, provincial or municipal authority, and general power of attorney to represent her in proceedings and lawsuits in any judicial proceedings of any kind and before any court, including international courts or bodies outside the territory of the Argentine Republic.” 10 The Court observes that that Ms. Habbal granted this power of attorney when she had parental authority over her son and daughters, who appear as alleged victims in the case, and the alleged victims have not revoked that power. The Court also notes that the attorneys mentioned represented the alleged victims in the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission based on this power of attorney. Therefore, the Court holds that the power of representation is in effect and is sufficient to authorize Carlos Varela Álvarez to represent the alleged victims before this Court, especially since representation before international courts or bodies is mentioned. 25. In relation to the State’s second preliminary objection (supra para. 18), the Court notes that the key issue in the instant case entails determining whether the State failed to fulfil its duty to respect the rights to nationality, movement and residence, the rights of the child, equality before the law, judicial guarantees and judicial protection in the immigration proceedings that resulted in a decision to expel the alleged victims and revoke Ms. Habbal’s citizenship. The Court is being asked to rule on these issues, which are obviously at the heart of the dispute in this case, and to determine whether the State’s actions violated the rights of the alleged victims, or whether their effects have ceased, and reparation has been made by the State’s subsequent actions. In its objection, the State does not dispute the Court’s jurisdiction to hear this case, but rather questions the need to establish the State’s international responsibility in the specific case and, if appropriate, the corresponding reparations. 10 Cf. Power of attorney granted to Carlos Varela Álvarez, Diego Jorge Lavado and Alejandro Omar Venier on February 24, 1993 (evidence file, folios 65 to 68), and power of attorney granted to S.F.G.C. on September 18, 1991 (evidence file, folio 60). 8