SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE GARCIA RAMÍREZ REGARDING THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CASE OF ESCUÉ-ZAPATA V. COLOMBIA, OF JULY 3, 2007 1. In the Order of this case as well as in other cases examined during the 76th Period of Regular Sessions (July 2007), such as the Case of Cantoral-Huamaní and Garcia-Santa Cruz v. Peru (Judgment of July 10, 2007), the Inter-American Court has shown its criterion regarding some interesting lines of thought with the connection that exists between the general duty to guarantee the rights and freedoms established in Article 1(1) of the American Convention, the Articles that the Convention recognizes as "substantive rights" (for example, Article 4: Life; Article 5: Humane Treatment; Article 7: Personal Liberty, among others) and those that refer to the so-called “procedural rights" or even better, " instrumental rights” (for example, Article 8: Access to justice in general; Article 25: Right to judicial protection of the fundamental rights, without prejudice of other rights which are also “procedural” or “instrumental” enshrined in articles assigned to the “substantive” category, such as the case of Article 4(6): Extraordinary means for amnesty, pardon, or commutation of sentence; and 7(6): Judicial control over the lawfulness of the detention, corresponding in general to habeas corpus). In previous occasions I have made reference to these issues and other issues related to them; for instance, according to my "Overview of the criminal due process of (procedural) law in the case law of the Inter-American Court” (“Panorama del debido proceso –adjetivo- penal en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana”), published in Latin American Constitutional Law Yearbook, Konrad Adenauer Institute, Uruguay, year 12, Volume II, 2006, pages 1111 and subs. 2. Since the first rulings on adversarial issues, the Court has highlighted that Article 1(1) of the American Convention vests a duty of protection in the State – or, if preferred, a double obligation -, with regard to the human rights enshrined in the Convention: a) on the one side, to respect the rights and liberties; b) on the other side, to guarantee its full and free exercise. This second duty, commonly called “obligation to guarantee”, implies, among other things, that the State "makes justice” within the domestic level. It is worth mentioning that there is a duty prior to naturally: for the need of concept-both statements: The obligation to “recognize” the rights and liberties established in the Convention, even though that recognition derives from the inclusion of such rights and liberties in the domestic body of law, or even if it results from the direct application of such recognition to the domestic body of law. 3. The foregoing means, with regard to the possible criminal consequence of the violations committed (regularly, the violations of human rights are gathered in criminal definitions, taking into account the fact they imply an intense infringement of the legal interests of the higher hierarchy), that the State investigate such violations and prosecute the responsible (obligation of means). This investigation serves the ends immediately related to the victim, as a way of redress (furthermore, they provide satisfaction to the relatives) and aims at the prevention of future violations that could multiply sheltered by impunity: Non-repetition of violations. The compliance with the duty of guarantee corresponds, thus and in certain manner, to what in other order is called “general prevention." 4. Up to the present, the Court has not declared, in general, the violation of Article 1(1) of the Convention, apart from other violations and without any connection thereto. The Court has found that the violation of the obligations to respect and guarantee is analyzed in connection with the violation of some other right established