3 is lack of proper investigation, Article 8 was also infringed). If the Court does not have jurisdiction, because on the time, over the case to declare the violation of a "material" right, it can, however, refer to the infringement of an "instrumental" right as long as the obligation to investigate as a result of the illegal act (not subject to the competence of the Court) derives from a body of law different from the ACHR and said obligation remains in force, since it is still pending in the stage recognized by the Court’s jurisdiction. 9. There is still the possibility, though, that Article 8(1) has been violated directly without being subjected to the Court’s jurisdiction or without the declaration of the Court regarding the existence of violation of "material" rights established in the Convention. This situation is proposed whenever: a) the plaintiff turns to the State to assert a right different from the ones established in the convention and the State disregards its petition. In the case in point, the denial of access constitutes, in itself, a violation of Articles 8(1) and the Court should so declare, in conjunction, of course, with Article 1(1) (the right of access to justice is protected, as any conventional rights, by the duty of the State to respect and guarantee) and without any mention to other rights and liberties enshrined in the Convention. b) it has been argued the violation of a “material” right of the Convention, but the Court does not provide the elements to declare that said violation effectively existed, though there are elements to establish that, having invoked an illegal act attributable (hypothetically) to the State, the State fails to comply with its duty to investigate. Therefore, the Court could not refer in its Judgment to the infringement of Article 8 conjunction with the "violation" of certain "material" right, but only, respectively, the violation of such as a result of: i) the plaintiff’s claim of rights not established the Convention or ii) the “alleged” violation (not proved before the Court) of Conventional right. in to in a 10. In the Case of Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, it was not outlined the possibility or the adequacy of applying Articles 8 and 25, pointing out the existence of different violations according to each of them or asserting that only one of them has been infringed. Nevertheless, in different occasions it has been noted the existence of two different points of view regarding this issue: one of them asserts the infringement of Articles 8 and 25; the other one, considers the violation of Article 8, not of Article 25. To such respect, I would like to comment: a) Article 8, more comprising, establishes the ordinary access to justice and enumerates its terms, the general (8(1)) as well as the one referring to the criminal prosecution (in broad sense) (8(2)), whose guarantees have been projected by the Court's jurisprudence in other ways of judicial or parajudicial protection, where applicable. This elaboration, which I think it is reasonable, contributes to outline and improve the protection of the person demanding justice. b) Article 25, with a broader sense, deals with a crucial aspect of the access to justice. The effective recourse for the protection of fundamental rights (not of any rights, such as the example of Article 8) that in the Mexican tradition (reflected in the words of Article 25 of the Convention) corresponds to the writ of amparo. It is understood that the proceedings related to the defense of fundamental rights must comply with the guarantees established in Article 8.