IV ANALYSIS OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF THE REQUEST FOR INTERPRETATION 8. Next, the Court will examine the State’s request to determine whether, based on the rules and standards developed in its case law, it is appropriate to clarify the meaning or scope of any provision of the judgment. 9. The Court has indicated that the request or petition for interpretation of a judgment may not be used as a means of challenging it, but must be made for the sole purpose of working out the meaning of the decision when one of the parties maintains that the text of its operative paragraphs or its consideranda is unclear or imprecise, provided those consideranda affect that operative paragraph. Hence, a request for interpretation may not be used to seek amendment or nullification or the judgment in question.2 10. Additionally, the Court has upheld the inadmissibility of using a request for interpretation to submit considerations on matters of fact and law already raised at the proper procedural time and on which the Court has already adopted a decision,3 nor to seek that the Court again assess matters already decided in the judgment.4 Similarly, this avenue cannot be used to attempt to broaden the scope of a reparation measure ordered in a timely manner.5 11. Therefore, the Court will now examine the issues raised by the State, as well as the observations made by the representatives and the Commission, in the following order: (a) regarding operative paragraph two; (b) regarding operative paragraph four; (c) regarding operative paragraph six; (d) regarding operative paragraph seven, and (e) regarding operative paragraph eight. A. Regarding operative paragraph two A.1 Arguments of the parties and the Commission 12. The State requested the Court to interpret the “scope” of operative paragraph two “as to respecting and protecting the rights of third parties who already held licenses to operate their radio stations, such that the State’s actions would not be considered as violations of basic rights.” It pointed out that the operative paragraph “allows for the possibility” of situations such as the following: the Superintendency of Telecommunications (hereinafter, “SIT”) or the Public Prosecutor’s Office must indicate to the usufructuary who files a complaint not being able to transmit in the radio frequency “to which he or she is entitled,” due to some interference in the transmission by “an unlicensed (allegedly community) radio station,” that “there is no mechanism” to “restore his or her usufruct right,” “since it is not possible to bring legal action against [said] radio station.” Moreover, the State pointed out that this situation Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Perú. Interpretation of the judgment on merits. Judgment of March 08, 1998. Series C No. 47, para. 16, and Case of Casa Nina v. Perú. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 1, 2021. Series C No. 433, para. 10. 2 Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Perú. Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs, supra, para. 15, and Case of Casa Nina v. Perú. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 11. 3 Cf. Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador. Interpretation of the judgment on reparations and costs. Judgment of August 29, 2011. Series C No. 230, para. 30, and Case of Casa Nina v. Perú. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 11. 4 Cf. Case of Escher et al v. Brazil. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 20, 2009. Series C No. 208, para. 11, and Case of Casa Nina v. Perú. Interpretation of the judgment on preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, supra, para. 11. 5 3