would amount to “a violation of the rights of the holder” of usufructuary rights and of other people in similar situations. Furthermore, it maintained that “even though the spirit of the judgment is to guarantee the rights of indigenous communities to use community radio stations, those stations that do have legal licenses to operate in the country are left unprotected.” 13. The representatives stated that the request for interpretation was presented "to the detriment and exclusion” of indigenous communities and people who were subject to illegal raids and criminal prosecution, and who lived under threat of such actions.” They indicated that the considerations and reasons given by the Court regarding the responsibility of the State for violating Article 13(2) of the American Convention are clear. Moreover, they held that the State was raising questions of fact that have already been discussed at the merits stage and which were previously analyzed in the judgment. Therefore, the representatives asked that the request for interpretation be declared inadmissible. 14. The Commission pointed out that paragraphs 158 to 172 of the judgment “clearly” expound the reasons why the Court “declared that the State violated the right to freedom of expression.” Therefore, it indicated that Guatemala could not use a request for interpretation as a means to challenge the judgment. Moreover, it argued that, in relation to the scope of the operative paragraph regarding the protection of “third parties’ rights,” the petition “does not constitute, per se, a request for interpretation.” In addition, it held that, as to these “third parties’ rights”, the Court “was clear when it established that the legislation in force not only violates the right to freedom of expression but it also discriminates against indigenous communities who seek to have access to the radio spectrum.” A.2 Considerations of the Court 15. In operative paragraph two, the Court ordered the following: 2. The State is responsible for the violation of the right to freedom of expression, recognized in Article 13(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to the obligations to respect and guarantee rights, established in Article 1(1) of the same instrument, to the detriment of the Maya Kaqchikel indigenous peoples of Sumpango and the Maya Achí indigenous peoples of San Miguel Chicaj, in the terms of paragraphs 157 to 172 of this judgment. 16. In paragraphs 166 to 171, the Court held, in this regard: 166. Furthermore, as indicated previously (supra para. 160) the imposition of subsequent liability for the exercise of freedom of expression must respond to an objective permitted by the American Convention, such as respect for the rights or reputations of others or the protection of national security, public order, public health or public morals. In the instant case, the criminal prosecution of the people who operated indigenous community radio stations does not fulfill any of the aforementioned purposes; on the contrary, the raids on the radio stations in question and the criminal trials violated the rights of indigenous peoples to freedom of expression and to participate in cultural life. 167. As for the analysis of the suitability, necessity and proportionality of the restriction of freedom of expression, the Court deems it essential to take into account that (i) the right to freedom of expression of indigenous peoples includes their right to establish and operate community radio stations; (ii) the laws that regulate broadcasting in Guatemala prevented, in practice, the Maya Kaqchikel indigenous people of Sumpango and the Achí of San Miguel Chicaj from legally accessing the radio spectrum, and (iii) the State has not made legislative or other efforts to recognize community broadcasters and ensure that the aforementioned indigenous communities could operate their radio stations. 168. With respect to the suitability and necessity of the criminal action to achieve the sought-after purpose, the Court has indicated previously, and reiterates the point in this case, that although a criminal instrument may be suitable to restrict the abusive exercise of certain rights, 4