13 * * FIRST PRELIMINARY OBJECTION “Lack of Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis” 31. The State raised its first preliminary objection based on its Instrument of Recognition of the contentious jurisdiction of the Court of June 6, 1995. This instrument contains the following declaration: I. The Government of El Salvador recognizes as binding ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in accordance with Article 62 of the American Convention on Human Rights, "Pact of San José." II. The Government of El Salvador, in recognizing that jurisdiction, states that its recognition is for an indefinite period and on condition of reciprocity, and that it retains the right to include exclusively deeds or juridical acts or deeds or juridical acts that begin after the date of deposit of this declaration of acceptance. 32. As a result, the State alleged that this declaration precludes the Court from hearing or ruling upon: a) events or juridical acts prior to the date of deposit of the Declaration of Acceptance; and b) “events or juridical acts which begin prior to the date on which the Declaration of Acceptance was deposited.” 33. On this point, the State also indicated that it submits to the Court’s consideration the second part of the declaration of recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction. According to the State, this declaration directs that the Court shall only have jurisdiction over those events or juridical acts which have begun subsequent to the date of deposit of the declaration of recognition, thus excluding events or juridical acts which begin prior to that date, and which continue to have effects subsequent to that date. 34. El Salvador indicated that upon applying this temporal limitation to the present case, “given that the events occurred on June 10, 1994, a hearing of these events, as well as some of the judicial investigation and prosecutorial actions, lie outside the Court’s jurisdiction, taking into account that this event generated effects in time such as the judicial proceedings and prosecutorial actions which include a variety of investigations to address that event; as a result, these events or juridical acts also would remain excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court, since they necessarily depend upon the generating event, which is the homicide of [Ramón Mauricio García Prieto].” The State supported its reasoning “on the basis that the accessory’s fate is the same as that of the principal, which is a general principle of Law and which indicates that if the events which gave rise to subsequent actions have as a point of departure the homicide of [Ramón Mauricio García Prieto ] which occurred on June 10, 1994, that is, prior to June 6, 1995, and if this […] is the generating event, and everything else derives from it, it would be contrary to the principle of legal certainty to exercise jurisdiction over the other events[…].” 35. The Inter-American Commission maintained that the Court has jurisdiction over the events and alleged violations that occurred subsequent to the date of the State’s recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction. In this regard, in its application, the Commission distinguished between those events which, in its opinion, were outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and those acts and omissions which were consummated independently subsequent to June 6, 1995, the date on which the State recognized the Court’s jurisdiction. According to the Commission, these acts