fact and the occasion, the manner in which it was carried out and the determining motives, reveal a greater and particular dangerousness of the agent”. 153. In the judgment of October 21, 1999, “social danger” was considered taking into account, inter alia, the position taken by the Public Prosecution official, the police record of the alleged victim, the motive of the crimes, and that "the purpose of the murder was to cause anxiety and uneasiness in society and an attempt on the administration of justice" [...] indicating the social impact of such acts is serious;.[...] Contempt for the offended party, because the victim turned out to be a woman, abuse of physical superiority, because the perpetrator of the crime used a firearm that weakened the victim's defense” (supra para. 76). 154. This Court has already had the opportunity to rule specifically on the application of the aforementioned Article 132 of the Criminal Code and the concept of “future danger” in the Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala. This Court established that the “assessment of the agent’s dangerousness implies the judge’s appreciation of facts that have not occurred and, therefore, supposes a sanction based on a judgment on the personality of the offender and not on the criminal acts imputed in accordance with the applicable criminal definition.”124 In said judgment, it was determined that the aforementioned norm was contrary to the American Convention, particularly because it violated Article 9 of the Convention; with the order to adapt said norm to international human rights law.125 155. Subsequently, this Court reiterated the incompatibility of the imposition of the death penalty based on the criterion of “dangerousness” with the principle of legality and the American Convention in the cases of Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala and Martínez Coronado v. Guatemala. Given the above and given the use of the criterion of dangerousness of the agent, both in the classification of the acts of the criminal offense committed by Mr. Valenzuela Ávila, and in the determination of the corresponding sanction, it is incompatible with the principle of legality established in the American Convention. 156. Consequently, the Court considers that the State is responsible for the violation of Articles 4(2) and 9 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the same instrument, to the detriment of Mr. Valenzuela. The Court also notes that in relation to the imposition of the death penalty, it was never executed, since the alleged victim died due to circumstances unrelated to the possible execution of the death penalty. In this sense, this Court considers that the State did not violate Article 4(1) of the Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) of the same instrument, notwithstanding it will be analyzed later in relation to his alleged extrajudicial execution. 157. Alternatively, the representatives argued the violation of Article 4(6) of the Convention for failing to guarantee access to an effective remedy to challenge an arbitrary sentence. In this regard, they indicated that Mr. Valenzuela filed an appeal for clemency on September 9, 2004, in which they requested that the death sentence be commuted to the immediately lower sentence of 50 years. As was alleged, this appeal had not been processed or resolved before Mr. Valenzuela's death. However, given that not enough evidence has been provided to allow the Court to determine a violation in the terms proposed by the representatives, it does not rule on the matter. C. Conclusion Cf. Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 95, and Case of Martínez Coronado v. Guatemala, supra, para. 70. 125 Cf. Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, supra, paras. 90, 93 to 98, and Case of Martínez Coronado v. Guatemala, supra, para. 69. 124 39