light of these rights, which include, as one of its components, the right to job stability and the right to judicial protection against arbitrary dismissals. In contrast, approaching the analysis solely from the perspective of the civil and political rights involved would be limited, as would focusing solely on the labor issue. When interpreting and applying the American Convention, this Court is, above all, a regional court of human rights, and its perspective must be broad enough to understand the overall context. In this regard, it is necessary to address these violations from the coexistence of several rights of the victims, which are indivisible and justiciable before this Court per se. Access to inter-American justice in this case, as in several others already known by this Court, will serve as a key to access other rights. I note that the metaphor of the key does not imply that we are facing a perspective that restricts direct justiciability to the right to work (or any other ESCER). It rather refers to simultaneous justiciability due to the interrelation among rights. I reiterate that we are not dealing with the thesis of connectedness but of simultaneity. Consequently, it cannot be considered that Article 19(6) of the Protocol of San Salvador is an impediment for the Court to consider its joint violation, since in application of the pro persona principle (Article 29(c) and (d) of the American Convention it is not reasonable to argue that there are human rights that are not protected by the Inter-American Human Rights System. 12. In this case, Articles 8(1), 8(2), 8(2) (b), 8(2) (c), 23(1) (c), 25, and 26, in relation to Article 1(1) and l 8(2) (h) in relation to Article 2 of the Convention are declared to be violated. Voting on each article separately in the Resolutions, in my view, disregards the principles of indivisibility, interdependence, and simultaneity, as I elaborated ut supra. I understand that, based on the conception I have supported regarding the interpretation and application of the Convention, the right to job stability and the right to protection against arbitrary dismissals are justiciable in relation to the coexistence of violations of various conventional rights, without the need to rely on justifications from the autonomous invocation of the conventional Article 26. The invocation of Article 26, in my opinion, is unnecessary or at least redundant. III. VIOLATION OF POLITICAL RIGHTS IN THE DISMISSAL OF A PUBLIC OFFICIAL 13. This judgment deals with a matter that has been repeatedly considered by the Court and is crucial to maintaining the rule of law in the region. I am referring to the guarantee established in Article 23(1) (c) of equal access to public service. As the judgment recognizes, the "Court has interpreted that equal access is an insufficient guarantee if it is not accompanied by the effective protection of tenure in the position,5 which indicates that the procedures for appointment, promotion, suspension, and dismissal of public officers must be objective and reasonable, that is, they must respect the applicable guarantees of due process."6 14. On several occasions, the Court had ruled on processes for the dismissal of public officers, specifically considering the guarantee of stability or irremovability on the job position.7 In this particular case, the Court has considered that the guarantees contained in Article 23(1) (c) of the Convention were applicable to Mr. Mina Cuero, since, as established in paragraph 110 in fine which asserts that "the dismissal of Mr. Mina Cuero disregarded the guarantees of due process, which arbitrarily affected his tenure in the position of police officer." 5 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 30, 2009. Series C No. 197, para. 138, and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of February 4, 2022. Series C No. 449, para. 85. 6 Cf. Case of Moya Solís v. Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of June 3, 2021. Series C No. 425, para. 108, and Case of Pavez Pavez v. Chile, supra, para. 85. Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, supra, para. 138, and Case of Cuyo Lavy et al. v. Peru. Preliminary 7 Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of September 28, 2021. Series C No. 438, para. 160. 4