40 territory), 10 (freedom of association), and 20(g) (arrest without a court order or by the judicial authorities in flagrante delicto) of the Constitution.” It also indicated that the arrest was in keeping with the provisions of Article 7 of the Convention, and that the state of emergency and suspension of guarantees was extremely relevant in this case. On this point, it rejected the Commission’s argument concerning a situation of estoppel related to the allegation of a state of emergency, because the State “has not changed its position, but ha[d] merely presented an additional and complementary argument on the same facts to strengthen its position.” Furthermore, in its answering brief, the State argued that Gladys Espinoza had been arrested by DIVISE agents, with sufficient evidence that there was a situation of flagrante delicto, as the result of police surveillance and intelligence work and for an ongoing offense, terrorism. Also, in its final written arguments, although it repeated that the arrest was made in a situation of flagrante delicto, it explained that it had presented the argument of a state of emergency in its answering brief, and that it had not varied its position. Thus, it maintained that, at the time of the presumed victim’s arrest, an individual could be deprived of liberty without the existence of a court order or flagrante delicto provided that the principles of reasonableness and proportionality were respected and that, “there should be no discussion as to whether or not flagrante delicto existed,” recalling that the terrorist group carried out abductions as part of its activities, and this fact relates to the purpose of the suspension of guarantees. b) Regarding the force and violence of the arrest, in its final written arguments, the State recalled that, during police operations against terrorist organizations, it was reasonable that the arrest could be resisted and, consequently, that there could be a skirmish between the agents and the persons arrested, without this leading to the conclusion that an act of violence entailing an arbitrary detention had occurred. In addition, the State asserted that it had not violated Article 7(4) of the Convention, because the presumed victim had been informed promptly of the reasons for her detention, and explained that the notification of arrest of April 18, 1993, had expressly informed her of the reasons for her detention. Furthermore, in the police statement made by the presumed victim on May 7, 1993, she had indicated that she agreed that she had been informed in writing of the reasons for her detention. The State also argued that, when an arrest is made in flagrante delicto, the requirement of a written notification is an accessory measure because the person arrested knows the reasons for the intervention by the authorities. Regarding the Commission’s argument that the police record of the arrest was not shown to the presumed victim, the State indicated that it was common practice that those arrested for terrorism refused to sign the arrest records, especially when, as a result of the operations, they were found in possession of terrorist material. c) Regarding Article 7(3) and 7(5), the State indicated that it had complied with the provisions of Article 7(5) of the Convention, and that the arrest of the presumed victim had not been arbitrary according to Article 7(3) of this instrument. In this regard, it affirmed that, following her arrest, the presumed victim had been brought before a judicial authority on May 17, 1993, and not on June 24, 1993, so that the allegation of the Commission and the representatives that she had been brought before a judge 80 days after being arrested was not true. d) Lastly, the State argued that the Court’s ruling on the incompatibility of Decree Law No. 25,659 with the Convention was unnecessary, since that norm had been annulled more than 20 years ago and that it had already been analyzed in previous cases heard by the Court against the Peruvian State, adding that, on its own initiative, the State had taken note of the error committed, and had rectified it. B) Considerations of the Court 106. The Court has established in its case law that Article 7 of the American Convention includes two types of very different regulations, one general and the other specific. The general regulation can be found in the first paragraph: “[e]very person has the right to personal liberty