79 221. From a general point of view, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter, “CEDAW”) defines discrimination against women as “[a]ny distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.” 377 In this regard, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (hereinafter, “the CEDAW Committee”) has stated that the definition of discrimination against women “includes gender-based violence, that is, violence that it directed against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately.” It has also stated that “[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously inhibits women's ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” 378 222. In the inter-American sphere, the preamble of the Convention of Belém do Pará indicates that violence against women is “a manifestation of the historically unequal power relations between women and men” and recognizes that the right of all women to a life free from violence includes the right to be free from any kind of discrimination. The Court has indicated that, when it has been shown that the application of a rule leads to a differentiated impact on women and on men, the State must prove that this is due to objective factors, unrelated to discrimination. 379 223. Lastly, the Court has established that women who have been arrested or detained “must not suffer discrimination, and must be protected from all forms of violence or exploitation.” This discrimination includes “violence against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women disproportionately,” and includes “acts that inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats to commit such acts, coercion and other forms of deprivation of liberty.” 380 224. Since the representatives’ arguments in this case refer to a supposed discrimination in relation to the obligation to respect and to ensure the right to personal integrity to the detriment of Gladys Espinoza, the Court will now determine whether the State failed to comply with the obligation contained in Article 1(1) of the American Convention owing to the alleged application to Gladys Espinoza of a discriminatory practice of violence and rape during her detention on the premises of the DIVISE and the DINCOTE in 1993. B.1. The discriminatory practice of sexual violence and rape 225. In the instant case, the Court has already established that, during the conflict that occurred between 1980 and 2000, sexual violence was a generalized practice within the security forces and its main victims were women (supra para. 67). The Court considers that this practice constituted gender-based violence because it affected women merely because they were women and that, as revealed by the evidence, it was encouraged by the anti-terrorism laws in force during that period, which were characterized by the absence of basic guarantees for detainees, in addition to establishing, among other matters, the power to keep detainees in solitary confinement and incommunicado (supra paras. 57, 58, 61, 62 and 64). 377 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women of 18 December 1979, Article 1. 378 Cf. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, General Recommendation 19: Violence against women, eleventh session, 1992, UN Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 84 (1994), paras. 1 and 6. 379 Cf. Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 16, 2009. Series C No.205, para. 396, citing EHCR, Opuz v. Turkey, Judgment of 9 June 2009, paras. 180, 191 and 200. 380 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 25, 2006. Series C No. 160, para. 303, and Case of González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra, para. 397.