22 other remedy is sought from any body with jurisdiction to review.82 In such sense, the division of labor characteristic of the exercise of judicial functions implies that reviewing bodies must only process the remedies sought by the parties objecting to the original decision. Consequently, by determining whether the appealed judgment was right or wrong from a legal point of view, no right of the original judges was affected and they did not become parties per se in the dispute referred to the CPAM. Therefore, the Court declares that the State did not violate the right of the victims to a hearing in such proceedings. * * * 74. On the other hand, the representative alleged that “the victims in the instant case were never heard at any hearing, neither private nor public.” In such sense he pointed out that “[s]uch possibility is not provided either in the autonomous amparo recourse procedure or in that for the recourse to the hierarchically superior instance” and that “[t]he only possibility they had to be heard in court [would have been] through an appeal for annulment [even though] it would have required permission by the Chamber, which may grant it or not, at its discretion.” The State and the Commission did not argue on this point. 75. In this regard, the Court considers that Article 8(1) of the Convention does not imply that the right to a hearing must necessarily be exercised orally in all proceedings. The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court could consider that an oral procedure is one of the “due guarantees” the State must afford the parties to certain kinds of proceedings. However, the representative has not advanced any argument justifying why an oral procedure is necessary, as a guarantee of due process, in the disciplinary procedure before the CORJS or in the one observed for the different recourses therefrom. 76. On the basis of the foregoing considerations, the Court declares that the State did not violate the right of the victims to a hearing in the aforementioned recourses proceedings. 5. Duty to state grounds 77. The Court has pointed out that the grounds are “the exteriorization of the reasoned justification that allows a conclusion to be reached.”83 The duty to state grounds is a guarantee linked to the proper administration of justice,84 protecting the right of citizens to be tried for the reasons provided by Law, and giving credibility to the legal decisions adopted in the framework of a democratic society. 78. The Court has underscored that the decisions adopted by national bodies that could affect human rights must be duly justified, because, if not, they would be 82 Cf. article 40, part 4 of the Venezuelan Judiciary Career Act] of August 25, 1978, published on September 11, 1998 in Extraordinary Official Gazette No. 5.262 (Evidence file, Book I, Annex A.7, pp. 121 to 132). 83 Cf. Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 107. 84 The European Court has so ruled in the Case of Suominen: “The Court then reiterates that, according to its established case-law reflecting a principle linked to the proper administration of justice, judgments of courts and tribunals should adequately state the reasons on which they are based.” Cf. Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, § 34, 1 July 2003.