25 85. As far as domestic law is concerned, the Court notes that the STJ has required a difference to be made between the oversight that is exercised over judges under ordinary jurisdiction and under disciplinary jurisdiction,92 that the seriousness of the infraction be weighed,93 and that a proportionate penalty be applied.94 Also, the State submitted a report addressing 5 cases in which a declaration of inexcusable judicial error by the reviewing organ led to the removal of the lower court judges by the CORJS,95 in spite of which the CORJS did state that it is necessary to assess whether “the judicial error is so serious as to warrant removal.”96 86. To sum up, under both domestic and international law there are, on the one hand, the remedies of appeal, cassation, review, removal of cases to a higher court or the like, which are aimed at verifying that a lower court’s decisions are correct, and, on the other, there is disciplinary oversight, which is intended to assess the conduct, suitability, and performance of the judge as a public official. Consequently, even if there is a declaration of inexcusable judicial error by a reviewing body, it is still necessary to analyze how serious the conduct is and whether the penalty is 92 For instance, in a case dealing with the allegedly wrongful removal of a judge, the CPAM held that “[The] legal judgment [of the removed judge] was reasonable and based on a decision adopted in the legitimate exercise of her functions, that is, […] at no point did it constitute the serious infraction of which she was accused by the [CORJS], for the purposes of applying the highest sanction, that is, removal from her position. Accordingly, the aforementioned Commission usurped the powers of the jurisdictional sphere and, in so doing, robbed her of the constitutional guarantee of autonomy and independence that the sanctioned judge possessed at the time of the aforesaid decision.” Cf. judgment No. 01771 of October 14, 2004 issued by the CPAM, supra note 13. 93 In a different case, the CPAM observed that “although, as the [IGC] pointed out, the judge under investigation committed a judicial error, as declared by the Chamber for Constitutional Matters of the [STJ], that error is not so serious as to entail his removal.” Cf. judgment No. 00331 of April 14, 2004 issued by the CPAM, supra note 13. 94 Thus, in a different case, the CPAM observed that “The Chamber considers that although a disciplinary infraction by a judicial officer should be sanctioned, the sanction imposed must always be consonant with the wrong committed, in order to balance the demands that are made on the judge with the rights also afforded to him. In this connection, in view of the investigative powers of an administrative judge, the Chamber believes that the sanction imposed by the disciplinary tribunal of the former Council on the Judiciary was not only disproportionate but also groundless, since its content was based essentially on the transcription that was made of the judgment emanating from the higher court that heard the conversion to divorce decree on appeal, and for this reason it is declared annulled. […] The judicial officer's conduct led to negligence in the processing of the cases of which she had cognizance, but this can in no way be identified with the development in jurisprudence that has given rise to inexcusable judicial error; on the contrary, the infraction that she committed, if any, could be grounds for another type of sanction, such as reprimand, or, to be specific, since it is regarded as more substantial than that, the sanction of suspension. For this reason, without substituting the administrative judge's powers for those of the administration, and in order to strike a balance between the infraction committed and the sanction to be imposed, this Chamber orders the [CORJS] to modify the penalty imposed, that is, to determine whether another type of disciplinary measure commensurate with the circumstances expounded throughout this case can be substituted for it.” Cf. judgment No. 01662 of October 28, 2003 issued by the CPAM, supra note 13. Similarly, in another case, the CPAM considered that “this Chamber agrees upon the existence of a judicial error to be attributed to the judge, but it disagrees on the sanction imposed on the petitioner by the [CORJS], given that even though the petitioner’s conduct did engender disciplinary responsibility, the subsequent penalty should be proportionate to the wrong committed so as to guarantee the judge the rights afforded to her. Therefore, the CPAM observes that the error committed was wrongly said to amount to a specific disciplinary infraction that, in the end, resulted in the imposition by the CORJS of a sanction disproportionate to the facts of the case. Hence, the CORJS’s decision must be annulled.” Cf. judgment No. 01285 of August 20, 2003 issued by the CPAM, supra note 13. 95 Cf. report No. 3561-07 of October 22, 2007 issued by the IGC (Evidence file, Book XIV, pp. 4246 and 4247). 96 Cf. order of February 12, 2007, delivered by the CORJS (Evidence file, Book XIV, pp. 4546).