26 proportionate.97 This sort of review requires an autonomous reason warranting a finding that a disciplinary offense has been committed. 87. In this regard, the Court has verified that both the IGC’s accusation and the CORJS’s removal order were based on the arguments set out in the CPAM’s decision as the only evidence and element of motive. In other words, they merely repeated the CPAM’s declaration. 88. It is the Court’s view that such disciplinary proceeding called for an analysis of inexcusable judicial error as a disciplinary offense, which required, first of all, reasons related to the fitness of the alleged victims to hold their offices. 89. Second, both the IGC’s accusation and the CORJS’s decision were required to state reasons regarding the serious nature of the offense allegedly committed by the First Court and the proportionate nature of the penalty that was recommended98 and eventually applied.99 90. Third, considering that the duty to state reasons does not call for a detailed reply to every single argument raised by the parties, but rather, the reasons given may vary depending on the nature of the decision, which is why whether said guarantee has been satisfied is an issue that must be analyzed in each specific case,100 the Court considers that the CORJS was required to provide its own 97 Similarly, this Court ordered that a penalty be applied proportionately to the nature and seriousness of the offense that was being tried, and the attenuating and aggravating circumstances attendant upon the case be borne in mind. Cf. Case of Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of September 15, 2005. Series C No. 133. 98 Indeed, the Venezuelan legislation in force at the time of the facts contemplated the grave and inexcusable error or disregard of the law by the judge as grounds for removal, as well as for suspension. Thus, Article 40 of the Judiciary Career Act (supra note 82) states: Provided that the due process is honored, Judges shall be suspended based on the following grounds: 4. When they have incurred in a grave and inexcusable judicial error as stated by a judgment issued by the Appeals Court, a higher judicial body or the respective Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice, as applicable, and when the removal of the judge has been required Furthermore, Article 38 of the Organic Law of the Consejo de la Magistratura [Council on the Judiciary] (Evidence file, Book I, Annex A.10, p. 195) states: A judge may be suspended if: 13. He or she adjudicates a case with grave and inexcusable disregard of the applicable law as determined by the Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice with knowledge of the issues.” In this regard, it is appropriate to demand the disciplinary tribunal’s justification for imposing one sanction over another in each particular case. 99 On this point it is relevant to quote Mr. Jesús María Casal Hernández who expressed that the CORJS “did not asses the alleged seriousness of the judicial inexcusable error. Such assessment could not be avoided in the event of imposing the maximum penalty of destitution. The principle of proportionality, the right of defense or the due process of law, as well as the need to honor the judge’s autonomy required such assessment from the CORJS.” Cf. affidavit by Mr. Jesús María Casal Hernández on January 17, 2008 (File on the Merits, Book III, p. 849). 100 The European Court has held as follows: “The Court reiterates that Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) obliges the courts to give reasons for their judgments, but cannot be understood as requiring a detailed answer to every argument (see the Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, p. 20, para. 61). The extent to which this duty to give reasons applies may vary according to the nature of the decision. It is moreover necessary to take into account, inter alia, the diversity of the