27 response, rather than respond by reference to the CPAM’s decision, at least to the main arguments of judges Apitz, Rocha and Ruggeri, namely: 1) the alleged lack of constitutive effects of the precautionary measure reviewed by the CPAM in the context of the removal of the case to a higher court,101 and 2) that the decision of the First Court embodied a plausible legal interpretation of the scope of a precautionary amparo.102 Regarding this latter issue, the Court believes that the reasons should operate as a guarantee which, to reply to such argument, would allow a reasonable difference in legal interpretations to be distinguished from an “inexcusable judicial error” that compromises the judge’s suitability to hold such office, so that judges will not be penalized for taking legal positions that are duly supported but do not correspond to those put forward by the reviewing organs. 91. Since that was not the case, in reality the disciplinary proceeding ended up being nothing but a mere formality. Accordingly, it is the Court’s view that the State failed to comply with its duty to provide reasons for the penalty of removal from office, thereby violating the “due guarantees” ordered in Article 8(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Mr. Apitz, Mr. Rocha, and Ms. Ruggeri. * * * 92. On the other hand, the State argued that the members of the First Court were not removed as a result of “political persecution, but that [the removal of its members] was the result of the misconduct and negligence […] in [the] exercise of their powers.” The State noted that “many users [materialized this] through complaints.” Indeed, the case file contains the accounts of complaints against the three judges of the First Court who are the victims in this case;103 however, it is the submissions that a litigant may bring before the courts and the differences existing in the Contracting States with regard to statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion, and the presentation and drafting of judgments. That is why the question whether a court has failed to fulfill the obligation to state reasons, deriving from Article 6 of the Convention, can only be determined in the light of the circumstances of the case.” Cf. Hiro Balani v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-B, p. 8, § 27. See also Ruiz Torija v. Spain, judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-A, p. 8 § 29; Suominen v. Finland, no. 37801/97, § 34, 1 July 2003; and Hirvisaari v. Finland, no. 49684/99, § 30, 27 September 2001. 101 Cf. written defense of Messrs. Apitz and Rocha before the CORJS (CORJS judgment of October 30, 2003, supra note 49, pp. 1066 and 1067), and written defense of Mrs. Ruggeri before the CORJS (CORJS judgment of October 30, 2003, supra note 49, pp. 1071 to 1073). 102 According to Messrs. Apitz and Rocha, “the actions of [the] [First] Court were based on duly justified procedural reasons, as they are the only available means to secure the restoration of the allegedly impaired legal situation [, such that] it exercised its own judicial functions […] even though the legal reasons that led to [the] decision conflict with other legal reasons asserted by the honorable [CPAM].” Cf. written defense of Messrs. Apitz and Rocha before the CORJS on October 14, 2003 (Evidence file, Book II, Appendix C.3, p. 540). In turn, Judge Ruggeri claimed before the CORJS that: “in case the parties to a case disagree with the judgment delivered by the Court either because they think that their rights have not been fully honored or because they have been breached, they may make use of the ordinary appeal mechanisms provided by the law. This is the rationale behind the constitutionally recognized principle of double instance. If we assume that any different criterion or interpretation applied by the higher court implies that the lower court has incurred in a judicial inexcusable error, we are not far from declaring that all reversed judgments do contain a judicial inexcusable error and, consequently, the lower judge’s disciplinary responsibility should be adjudicated.” Cf. written defense of Mrs. Ruggeri before the CORJS (CORJS judgment of October 30, 2003, supra note 51, p. 2653). 103 Cf. account of complaints against Apitz, Rocha, and Ruggeri issued by the IGC (Evidence file, Book II, Appendix C.3, pp. 379 to 426). Fifteen complaint forms were filed against Mrs. Ruggeri, 13 against Mr. Rocha and 14 against Mr. Apitz. Regarding these complaints, their status is “closing” in all cases; two of them, affecting all three judges, are at the “accusation” stage; one of them concerns the