terminal illness, the latter indicated that “arteriosclerotic disease of the lower left limb [was] at an advanced stage” and, for his part, the Judiciary’s doctor gave an opinion to the contrary saying that the diabetes was a terminal illness, this being defined as one which “at a given moment could ultimately result in death.” However, in his decision the judge merely stated that “at this time, the illness cannot be considered terminal,” without taking into account the diagnosis of the associated ailments and without weighing up the medical criteria or explaining why he disagreed with the doctor’s opinion, which assessed the disease and its possible fatal consequences in other terms. In addition, the judge did not refer to the COF’s institutional capacity to address the situation described. Furthermore, in several reports, the doctors stated that they did not know whether the COF could provide treatment, since they were not familiar with the prison, the medical assistance provided there, or with the medication provided to Mrs. Chinchilla.347 In spite of this, the enforcement judge did not visit the COF to verify these statements, nor did he adopt other measures so that the medical experts could discuss their concerns in situ. The judge did not refer to the difficulties expressed by the presumed victim in maintaining reasonable conditions of detention in the COF, owing to her disability. 251. In the last of the incidental motions, the judge dismissed the motion, considering that to grant early release under extraordinary remission of sentence, “it is not a requirement for the convict to be suffering from a particular illness; on the contrary, as Article 7 (c) of the Sentence Remission Law provides, it is essential for the convict to have performed acts of altruism, heroism or any other humanitarian act, something that has not been accredited at any time.” Furthermore, he considered that “the benefit requested was not created to enable a convicted person to die with dignity.” (supra para. 144). 252. Finally, beyond the formal opportunities afforded by the incidental motions filed by Mrs. Chinchilla before the Second Criminal Enforcement Court, which were decided without due justification, three of them by the same judge, the fact is that the remedy attempted before that judicial body was not effective in addressing her complaints regarding the obvious and proven progressive deterioration in her health and the need to provide conditions of detention compatible with her dignity. Thus, in addition to deciding not to release her from prison, the court did not order any other corrective measures to seek a comprehensive solution to her situation, for example by requiring the COF to ensure stricter supervision of her guarantees, through some form of inter-institutional coordination, or by urging the prison authorities to offer solutions or guarantees that she would receive adequate treatment regularly or in the event of an emergency. In other words, the judge should also have exercised his role as guarantor in relation to the prison conditions of a gravely ill person with a disability, ensuring that her lack of accessibility and reasonable accommodation within the prison did not translate into even harsher conditions, with greater physical or psychological suffering, which could harm her personal integrity and could even constitute a form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. In this regard, it is difficult to understand that, after receiving a request for a report from the Defender of Due Process and Prisoners, the Second For example, the attending physician at the HSJD stated that he “[was] not familiar with the conditions where [she] live[d] to be able to answer […] correctly [if she could receive ambulatory treatment]”; he said he did “not know if she injected herself with insulin or someone else” and that there was a possibility of sudden death. The medical examiner of the Public Prosecution Service stated that he “[was] unable to say [if she received treatment], because to do so, he would need […]information on what resources the institution has;” in the fourth incidental motion, the medical examiner of the Public Prosecution Service stated that he “[was] not familiar with the facilities [in the COF]as regards professional health care staff […] if a complication were to arise” and that he was “not familiar with the specific medical care received by the patient […] at the prison Center […][and] the written records on the care she has received or is receiving in prison.” The attending physician at the HSJD replied “So far, yes” in response to whether Mrs. Chinchilla was taken to hospital in good time, and reported that she mentioned that she was not given the medication prescribed to her; he said he did “not know” who administered her insulin and indicated that did “not know” if Mrs. Chinchilla “[was] consistently receiving such treatment daily in prison.” 347 80