385. The Commission maintained that in cases such as this, where the State learns of alleged extrajudicial executions in the context of a military operation, the authorities who investigate the matter should be independent, both de jure and de facto, from the personnel involved in the facts. The Commission said that the jurisdiction of the military courts should apply only when legally protected military interests come under criminal attack, in a case involving the particular functions of defense and state security, and never to investigate human rights violations. In this connection, the Commission concluded that arbitrary extrajudicial executions cannot be considered a crime of military service, but serious human rights violations, and therefore, the investigation into the facts of the instant case should have been pursued in the ordinary jurisdiction. 386. The Commission added that the military courts cannot be an independent and impartial body to investigate and prosecute human rights violations because the military has a deeply rooted esprit de corps. The Commission also held that, “when military authorities prosecute an active subject who, like them, is also a member of the army, impartiality becomes difficult because the conduct of certain members of the security forces is being investigated by other members of the same forces; this often serves to cover up the facts instead of clarifying them[. A] court’s impartiality derives from the fact that its members do not have a direct interest, have not taken a preconceived position, do not have a preference for any of the parties, and are not involved in the dispute.” The Commission also pointed out that the family members of the alleged executed victims would have no access to the military courts, combined with the fact that the personnel involved were acquitted without an independent investigation, and the facts had thus remained unpunished. 387. Based on these arguments, the Commission held that in the instant case, the State of Peru “overstepped the sphere of military justice, breaching the parameters which are defined by exception and restriction. It had broadened the jurisdiction of the military courts to include crimes having no direct relationship to military discipline[,] in this case, extrajudicial executions[,] or to the legally protected military interests of that jurisdiction. It had dismissed the case against the military personnel who took part in the operation[,] preventing family members [of the alleged victims] from having access to justice.” 388. The representatives maintained that it was already proven that “Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva and Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza did not die in an armed clash, but that instead, they had been captured and were neutralized at the time they were executed.” They held, therefore, that the incident was unrelated to questions of discipline or military mission, but was a blow against interests protected by domestic criminal laws and by the American Convention, that is, against the lives of the alleged victims. The representatives asserted, accordingly, that “the intervention by the military courts in the investigation and prosecution of these facts runs counter to the principles of exception and restriction that should apply to this jurisdiction.” They held that the submission of this case to the military jurisdiction violated the principle of natural justice and the right of the victims and their families to be heard by an independent and impartial judge, as “the lack of impartiality and independence of the military jurisdiction in this case is clearly demonstrated […] by the fact that these courts decided to dismiss the case against all the military personal who were being prosecuted, taking their accounts of the facts as true and setting aside all evidence that could have led to the conclusion that it was a case of extrajudicial execution.” 389. The representatives in their closing arguments emphasized the opinion offered by expert witness Andreu, that “the presence of armed conflict or a situation of a state of emergency is irrelevant for determining whether the military courts have jurisdiction, as circumstances of means or time have no bearing on the legal interest being protected.” They emphasized that the case entailed “execution of a person out of combat, making it a serious