“the military Operation Nipón 96 had been planned and executed, and (iii) confirm “that it had been conducted with respect for the standards of international humanitarian law and international human rights Law”. 133. The President issued an order (supra para. 9) holding that it would be useful and necessary for shedding light on and proving the facts in dispute, and for better understanding certain circumstances relevant to the case, to apply Article 58(a) and 58(d) of the Rules of Procedure and pay a visit to the city of Lima, Peru, on January 24, 2014, to incorporate into the evidence the procedure to “reconstruct the facts”, considering that the legally relevant facts that underlie the alleged extrajudicial executions in the case at hand are essentially in dispute. The Court believed that a reconstruction of the facts would meet the need to verify the physical and spatial environment in which they occurred so as to draw a legal conclusion as to whether the events could have taken place in the terms alleged and in keeping with the evidence submitted in the case file. The Court did emphasize, however, that a procedure of this kind was of a different nature in the international jurisdiction. 134. It began with a visit to the site of the residence of the Japanese ambassador in San Isidro, Lima, and the surrounding area. The delegations then visited the Las Palmas military base in the district of Chorrillos, Lima, where the “Replica of the Residence of the Japanese ambassador” had been built, and passed through the area of the Tactical Operations Center (COT) and Peru’s Military Hospital and National Police Hospital. They then received an explanation about the planning and execution of the operation, in full view of the mock-up of the residence and the display of weapons used by members of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and by the forces of the State of Peru during the hostage rescue operation. The delegations also entered and toured the areas of the first and second floors of the replica. The operation was dramatized that afternoon. During the procedure, the delegations of the representatives and the Commission made any clarifying comments they deemed relevant. 135. The State said that the agreement by the Court to conduct the exercise had been “a measure that widens the scope of evidence and will facilitate their ability to understand and assess the facts and law.” The State held that the procedure had allowed the Court judges to see the site of the facts and the place where Peru’s state task force (Tenaz Patrol) had trained, and details of the hostage rescue operation according to the plans for Operation “Nipón 96”, taking into account that the attempt was made to overcome material constraints, and therefore asked the Court to weigh “this piece of evidence carefully”. 136. The representatives felt that the exercise to reconstruct the facts should be given “merely contextual relevance, and it is not material to the facts of the case.” They noted, more specifically, that: (i) this case does not entail the overall operation, but the specific facts in which the alleged extrajudicial executions of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez, Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva and Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza had taken place; (ii) during the procedure, the State had omitted any reference on what had happened to Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez and had given no explanation whatsoever about the place where his body was found, and (iii) the State drew no association between the dramatization of what happened with Meléndez Cueva and Peceros Pedraza, and any of the evidence contained in the case file. In summary, the representatives found that the various scenes acted out during the exercise “were intended to dramatize the combat in general terms, not the way the specific facts of the case had occurred.” They therefore asked the Court to hold that the procedure to reconstruct the facts, held on January 24, 2014, held only contextual value and lacked evidentiary weight regarding the facts that were the object of this case. 137. The Commission found that the cause of action addressed by the case was not consistent with the purpose of the procedure to reconstruct the facts and emphasized three