reopened on March 12, 1997 in a meeting between the Peruvian government spokesman and representatives of the MRTA.119 The Commission of Guarantors issued a call to the government and the MRTA on March 21, 1997, stating that it “had nearly reached its limit.” 120 Néstor Fortunato Cerpa Cartolini did not accept the proposal to take asylum in Cuba and reiterated his demands.121 He also announced again that talks were suspended and accused the government of preparing an assault on the residence through a tunnel. 122 In a final effort, in April, 1997, President Fujimori Fujimori attempted to push negotiations forward by agreeing to release three subversives, later adding three more, but his proposal was not accepted by top MRTA leaders.123 D. Planning the “Nipón 69 Plan of Operation” or “Operation Chavín de Huántar” 151. Even as negotiations were underway, President Fujimori Fujimori issued orders to develop a hostage rescue plan involving the Armed Forces and the Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional (SIN), National Intelligence Service. 124 He ordered then Commander General of the Army and Chairman of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos, as well as then advisor to the SIN Vladimiro Montesinos Torres and the top military commanders to develop contingency plans for a military operation to free the hostages and take back the residence of the Japanese ambassador in case negotiations should fail. 125 152. A Centro de Operaciones Tácticas (COT), Tactical Operations Center was established to draw up the plan. The ranking officer, Brigadier General Augusto Jaime Patiño, Commander General of the First Division of the Army Special Forces and also chief of the COT, was assigned to develop the plan.126 He charged the planning and execution to Army Infantry Colonel José 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folios 13415 to 13416). Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 723 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 9). 119 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 723 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 9). 120 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 723 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 9). 121 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 723 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 9). 122 Cf. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13416). 123 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 723 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 9). 124 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 723 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 9). See also, Plan of operation A. “NIPON” 96 (1st Div FFEE), January, 1997, p. 2 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2 to the case submission brief, folio 26), and ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13417). 125 Cf. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima on October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folios 126